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ABSTRACT

These 10 papers represent an application of a philosophical theory to resolving a particular problem in adult education or an example of how some of these problems can be examined philosophically. Chapter 1 addresses the myth of the philosophy of adult education. Chapter 2 reports a survey of professors of adult education to determine why they neglect to do research in the area of the philosophy of adult education. In chapter 3 four ways of justifying ethical studies in adult education are discussed. Chapter 4 considers existential consequences of mandatory continuing education. Three evaluation problems in adult education are analyzed in chapter 5: are adult education evaluations of programs or learners?, can evaluations be shown to be valid?, and can evaluation be used to improve adult education programs? Chapter 6 explains the existential concept of evaluation. The focus of chapter 7 is the concept of human rights as applied to discussion of needs in program planning. Chapter 8 is a philosophical defense for education of the older adult. Chapter 9 summarized Llessur Nosdunk's theory of alienation as related to adult education. Discussion in chapter 10 focuses on the "is-ought-is" problem of the objective in adult education. (YLB)

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A Philosophical Analysis of Selected Problems in Adult Education

by

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INTRODUCTION

Five major books are currently on the market on the philosophy of adult education.[1,2,3,4,5] These books are well written, provide the reader with foundation knowledge on both the concepts of philosophy in general and the philosophy of adult education in particular, identify some of the philosophical problems extant in the "field" of adult education, and help the reader to deal with some of these problems. This book is uniquely different from these books in that it addresses specific problems and issues in adult education. This book also differs from these others in the sense that it applies various philosophical theories as a means to clarifying and resolving certain problems and issues in adult education. In this sense it should be looked upon as an applied work, one that can help adult educators and students of adult education as theoreticians and practitioners. It should be looked upon as a "workbook of ideas" to help adult educators and students of adult education to think critically about the many issues and problems in adult education. Further, it should be looked upon as a "starting" point for further analysis and speculation. If it is viewed this way then it has served its purpose.

R.S. M-K.

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Chapter 1

THE MYTH OF THE PHILOSOPY OF ADULT EDUCATION

Two adult educators meet at a research conference. One claims to be a philosopher while the other claims to be a scientist. Both are interested in the area of research methodologies so they begin to discuss the importance and need for scientific research and philosophical research. The philosopher begins to argue that adult educators should take notice of philosophy because it can help them answer value questions that arise in adult education. The scientist begins to argue that adult educators should concentrate further on the use of the scientific method because it is the only method capable of answering the kinds of questions necessary for developing adult education. At this point the philsopher of adult education begins to argue with the scientist claiming that science is not the only way to advance the adult educators knowledge about adult education. He makes the claim that science can indeed answer questions that arise in adult education like "How do adults learn?" but cannot answer evaluative questions that frequently arise in adult education.[1,2,3,4,5] The scientist agrees but adds that answering value questions like "How should adult educators teach?" are not as important as answering questions like "How do adults learn?" because these kinds of questions can be verified or falsified and hence are sources of knowledge. The argument continues but neither seems to be listening to the other.

Finally, after fifteen minutes the philosopher says, "I agree that science is important and necessary in developing adult education, but I do not think it is sufficient. It cannot answer the many value questions that are implied by factual questions." A few minutes before this another adult educator joined

the philosopher and the scientist and overheard the essence of the conversation. He asks the question, "How do questions of fact, 'is' questions of science, distinquish science from philosophy? Don't philosophers ask 'is' questions as well? Aren't both philosophers and scientists concerned with questions like, "What is an adult?", and "What is learning?" And, how do questions of value or 'should or ought questions' distinquish philosophy from science? Don't scientists ask 'should or ought' questions?" He continues. "It seems to me both of you are committing what I shall call the 'existential fallacy'." "Both of you are saying that some how science and philosophy exist in the world as trees do and are physically different than each other. But don't the two exist because of your interest and the complexity of human life?"

"You both speak as though your area of interest has a separate reality; independent of your existence. Isn't it true, however, that science is science because it has been <u>defined</u> differently than philosophy? And, isn't it true philosophy is philosophy because it has been defined differently than science? Isn't it also true that below the surface of your argument, both of you ask the same kinds of questions? Surely scientists as human beings who are capable of thinking, and feeling, are as much concerned with the value of what they do as are philosophers. And, surely philosophers as humans who are capable of thinking and feeling are as much concerned with facts as scientists are. Without facts, for instance, what would philosophers have to analyze? And, isn't it true that scientists investigate the world based on what people need and what they value as good?" The world would be a pitiful place to live if scientists, who are first thinking and feeling human beings, did not question the value of their interests and creations."

"Both of you have created science and philosophy or interpret them as existent beings that possess distinctively different characteristics. The fact of the matter is that the only thing that can distinquisth philosophy from science, and science from philosophy, is your individual interests and these interests have in part developed from your realization that no one person can possibility deal with every dimension or aspect of human life. The complexity of the world makes it mandatory that there be scientists and philosophers. Many scientists are too busy with their empirical research to do philosophy apart from the value questions they need to ask with reference to their research. Philosophers, too, are busy dealing with facts and value propositions from a conceptual point of view. They do not have the time to conduct empirical research. In both cases, however, the scientist and the philosopher are capable of dealing with 'is' questions and 'value' questions. If science and philosophy are distinquishable on this point, then what prevents distinquishing philosophy from psychology or any other discipline on the same point? Don't people who have an interest in other disciplines and who do research in these disciplines also ask both 'is' and 'value' questions? There must be philosophers, scientists, as well as many others to tackle the many aspects of human life. You can compare and contrast your interests and your approaches to human problems, but you cannot compare or contrast these interests as though they exist in the material world with some distinctive characteristics apart from the way you have defined them."

"Each approach to human problems are human creations subject to the feelings and thoughts of their creators. I think if you recognize this you will see that philosophy and science can be the same things if you

want them to be the same things. They can also be different things, methods, as you have already argued about. What do you think? Do you still think science is only capable of answering 'is' questions or factual questions; and philosophy is capable of answering 'should' questions? Or, do you still think philosophy and science somehow exist incependently of your own ideals, interests, and the fact that the complexity of human life prevents a person from doing both to the satisfaction and depth about your own thinking about it? It is you who are different and want to be different, not philosophy and science. They are simply your creations, or extensions of your beliefs, experience and thoughts."

Both The philosopher of adult education and the scientist of adult education looked at each other and walked to the dining room for lunch.

Although this story has been contrived, it illustrates a very important point about the concept of the philosophy of adult education. It illustrates that it is not philosophy and science that ar different or the same, but the people who profess them. Some shilosophers of adult education may be very good at arguing the position that philosophy is different than science and that it is necessary as a research method in adult education according to their definitions of science and philosophy, but this hardly demonstrates philosophy and science are different. It only demonstrates that the adult educator who argues this believes it is necessary and the it is the only approach capable of answering value questions. The same is true of the adult educator who argues that the scientific method is superior to philosophy as a research method.

If adult educators want to work together to solve the many problems

of adult education, they can. If they want to they can also create any approach they want and call it whatever they want, but that will not change the fact that a problem still exists in adult education that needs to be solved. Perceiving each others abilities to think in different ways is the key to the development of adult education. If it is wanted, it will become a reality.

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Chapter 2

Neglect to do Research in the Area of the Philosophy of Adult Education

INTRODUCTION

The nature and aim of child education has been discussed by dozens of Western philosophers since Socrates first questioned the nature of man twenty-five hundred years ago. Few of these philosophers however, have equally examined the nature and aim of adult education (1).

The neglect adult education has received from philosophers appears to equal the neglect it has received from its own ranks, namely professors of adult education (1:195-96).

Although there seems to be a desire among some professors of adult education to develop a philosophy of adult

education, or a "systematic conceptual framework embodying certain values from which one views the many aspects of the field of adult education," (1:196) few professors of adult education do research in the philosophy of adult education as reflected in the amount of literature written by them on the subject.

Since the publication of Eduard Lindeman's book in 1929, THE MEANING OF ADULT EDUCATION, (2) fewer than "a dozen books and twenty articles" have been written by professors of adult education on the philosophy of adult education (1:195). Although Roberts (3), Apps (4), Bergevin (5), Blakely (6), McKenzie (7), Paterson (8), Lawson (9), and a few others have commented on the need for a philosophy of adult education, none of these professors of adult education have surveyed the professors of adult education to determine "why" so few professors of adult education neglect to do research in the area.

Therefore, the purpose of this study was to do what they have neglected to do: survey a sample of professors of adult education to determine "why" they neglect to do research in the philosophy of adult education

METHOD

A survey questionnaire was created by the researcher in order to generate the data. Its design was based on

a similar study done by Nyberg (10), a philosophy professor at the State University of New York-Buffalo. The purpose of his study however, was to determine the beliefs undergraduates held toward the real life utility of philosophy, thus his design had to be modified.

The written survey questionnaire was chosen as the data generating method because of its feasibility in terms of time and cost of administration. The questionnaire was hand delivered to each of the professors selected as respondents and requested they return it to the researcher a week later.

The questionnaire items were designed in terms of answering three questions, which constituted the definition of "why" some professors of adult education neglect to do research in the Philosophy of Adult Education: (1) the professors interest in philosophy, (2) the professors skill at philosophical analysis, and (3) the professors background in philosophy. The first six items of the questionnaire however, were designed to gain demographic information to possibly help explain "why" they neglected to do philosophical research. The remaining sixteen questionnaire items were categorized as follows: items 14,15,27, and 28 were designed in terms of criteria (1)

and (3), and the remaining items were designed in terms of criterion (2).

The twelve professors who served as respondents for the study were randomly drawn from a list of thirty professors of adult education who staff a Department of Adult Education at a major United States university.

A sample was drawn from this population because it was available to the researcher and because it appeared upon comparison to be representative of other adult education departments across the United States. Representativeness was based upon the courses offered by the departments of adult education in ten universities. The source of this data were university catalogs. It was assumed that the course offerings reflected the interests, skills, and backgrounds of the professors of adult education across universities.

RESULTS

Of the twelve professors randomly drawn as respondents, seven completed the questionnaire. Tables I, II, and III summarize the demographics of these professors.

TABLE I

Questionnaire Items 1 through 6						
1	2	3	4		5	6
Age	Sex	Rank	Full-time	Part-time	Years as Faculty Member	Joint Appointments
32	F	Assist Prof	x		4	School of Ed. Family Studies
60	M	Prof	x		28	Ed. Policies
57	M	Prof		x	28	none
43	M	Prof	x		11	Curr. & Instr.
43	M	Prof	x		20	none
53	M	Prof	x		16	Curr. & Instr.
55	M	Prof		x	15	none
TOTAL		7				

TABLE II

Questionnaire Items 7 through 9		
7 University where Ph.D. was earned	8 Dissertation Area	9 Percent time for research
University of Missouri-Columbia	Student Teaching Success As Related to Selected Variables	10%
University of Minnesota	Curriculum & Instr. in Rural Education	25%
University of Minnesota	Student Placement in Agricultural Education	15%
Michigan State University	Vocational Education	20%
University of Wisconsin	Leadership in 4-H	15%
University of Chicago	Educational Psychology	50%
University of Wisconsin	Extension Administration	10%
TOTAL	7	

TABLE III

Questionnaire Items 10 through 12		
10 Undergraduate Major	11 Major at Master's Level	12 Research Interests
Home Economics Education	Home Economics Education	Inservice Education, Teacher Education, Vocational Education
Agricultural Education	Rural Education	Exemplary Teaching in Adult Education
Agricultural Education	Agricultural Education	Vocational Education, Leadership Development in Adult Ed.
Agricultural Education	Agricultural Education	Inservice Models for Education, Philosophy of Vocational Education
Agricultural Education	Agricultural Education	Community Development Education, Philosophy of Adult and Continuing Education, Non-traditional Students
Secondary Education	Social Science	The Dynamics of Small Groups, Psychological Aspects of Learning and Teaching of Adults
Animal Science	Extension Administration	Professional Development of The Practicing Adult Educator, Facilitating Learning in the Professional Adult Educator
TOTAL	7	

The following results were obtained from the seven professors responses to questionnaire items 13 through 28:

--one professor defined philosophy as a "viewpoint" while the others either defined it as "a way of thinking," the "love of wisdom," a "discipline," a "process," or did not respond

--all seven professors had a least one informal or formal course in philosophy with five of them having two or more

--four of the professors defined the "philosophy of adult education" in exactly the same way as they define philosophy, while the other three said there is no such thing or did not give a clear definition

--six of the professors said philosophy applies to adult education while one said it did not

--six of the professors said a "philosophy of adult education is absolutely necessary to the development of adult education and to the practice of adult education while one professor did not comment

--all seven said philosophy and science are highly related and that one implies the other

--four of the seven professors argued philosophy courses should be required of graduate students in adult education, while two professors said they should not be

required, and one did not comment

--three professors said all graduate students of adult education should be required to take courses on the "philosophy of adult education," the "philosophy of the social sciences," the "philosophy of vocational education," the "task of the philosopher," and in general any applied philosophy course; while four professors did not comment

--four of the seven professors said they frequently read books on general philosophy, philosophical journals, and on the philosophy of science and existentialism, while the other three said they did not. The same proportion said they are interested in participating in informal and formal courses in philosophy.

DISCUSSION

From these results several inferences can be made in terms of the criteria of this study and in terms of answering the question: "Why do some professors of adult education neglect to do research in the area of the philosophy of adult education?"

First, it is interesting to note that although all seven of the professors believed and argued on the questionnaire that philosophy and science are highly related and in fact imply each other, their reseach is primarily

scientific. Closely related to this is the fact most of the professors are not interested in doing philosophical research as indicated in Table III. A glaring contradiction seems to emerge here. On the one hand all seven of the professors believe philosophy and science are highly related and all seven of the professors have some formal or informal course background in philosophy, yet most of them (one of the professors has written several papers on philosophy) do not involve themselves in philosophical research. One could speculate this is because of some psychological reason such as they may feel insecure about doing philosophical research; that they feel their academic background in philosophy has not adequately prepared them to do philosophical research. Further research needs to be conducted to determine this however.

Another interesting incongruity that emerges from this data is that although all seven of the professors have argued that philosophy is necessary to the development of adult education and to the development of adult educators, only three of these professors believed graduate students of adult education (and consequently adult educators) should be required to take philosophy courses. One may not view this as necessarily an incongruity because the remaining three professors may agree

that philosophy is necessary to the development of adult education and to the development of adult educators, but that graduate students and professional adult educators should not be required to take philosophy courses. Further research should also be undertaken to determine the relationship(s) between those adult educators who believe philosophy is necessary and those adult educators who believe it is not, and whether or not graduate students and practicing adult educators should be "required" to take philosophy courses. Furthermore, research should be done on the relationship of the knowledge and skill gained by graduate students and adult educators who are either required to take philosophy courses and who take them voluntarily; and the effect this knowledge and skill has on their thinking, practice, and competence as adult educators.

Third, it is interesting to note the relationship between the professors definitions given for philosophy and their response that philosophy and science imply each other. In explaining why adult educators generally neglect to do philosophical research, research should be undertaken to investigate the relationship between adult educators definition of philosophy and their definition of science. An incongruity emerges in this study in this

respect if the adult educators sampled are defining philosophy and science in the same way. It is clear in this study how these adult educators define philosophy, i.e., as a "viewpoint," a "way of thinking," etc. but it is unclear how they define science. It is unclear from their response, "philosophy and science are highly related and that one implies the other," that they are defining philosophy as different than science or that science is different than philosophy, or that the two are essentially the same. The incongruity emerges if by this response they mean philosophy and science are essentially the same, i.e., science is the "love of wisdom," or a "viewpoint," because defining the two as essentially the same implies adult educators should also neglect to do scientific research.

It is not enough that adult educators become more involved in doing philosophical research, but that they also clearly define the place and use of philosopy in adult education. More research should be done to determine the perceptions adult educators have of philosophy as a method of analysis and its use in developing adult education as a system of education.

Although this study has not provided clear answers to the question, "Why do some professors of adult education neglect to do philosophical research," it has provided some basis from which further research can be developed.

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Chapter 3

The Justification of Ethical Studies in Adult Education

Many adult educators shy away from the term "ethics" and from involving themselves in "ethical research" or researching the ethical dimension or "should" questions that arise in their profession. According to Apps, for one, they are more comfortable with researching factual questions than "should" questions and therefore ignore "should" questions.[1] But in a society that is progressively becoming more impersonal as a result of greater emphasis on technological development and the scramble for resources, can adult educators afford to ignore the ethical dimension of their profession?

Ethical studies in adult education can be justified at least four ways: (1) based on the lack of ethical studies done in adult education as reflected in the adult education literature, (2) based on logical arguments that ethical studies are needed in adult education, (3) based on the point-of-views of some prominent professors of adult education, and (4) based on the point-of-views of some adult education practitioners.

(1) The Adult Education Literature

The British philosopher of education, R.W.K. Paterson, has provided strong support for the need of philosophical studies in adult education in general and ethical studies in particular.

Paterson has argued that traditional empirical studies are necessary in adult education but are not sufficient since they are not capable of answering "normative questions" or questions about values in adult education:

> Empirical research can show for example, the results of employing a certain teaching method, but it cannot show that these results are educationally desirable or undesirable; empirical research can tell us how most tutors in fact regard their role, but it cannot tell us what role the tutor ought properly to be.[2]

Another British philosopher and adult educator, Kenneth H. Lawson, claims philosophy in general and ethical studies in particular have been ignored in adult education. According to Lawson:

> Debates within adult education deal mainly with organizational questions and the application of education to social problems rather than with what may be called 'philosophical issues.'[3]

Lawson is one of the few adult educators who is specifically concerned with the ethical problems in adult education. In reference to teaching-learning situations in adult education he has remarked that:

> Any relationship between people which affects or is likely to affect one or the other raises moral issues and we can ask 'ought I to bring about effect x as a result of my action?' or 'what ought the nature of my relationship with y to be, bearing in mind that I might influence him?' The moral or ethical dimension is always present when relationships between people are involved because part of our definition of a ethical issue is one that arises or might arise out of my decision to act in relation to someone else. In this sense the choice to consume more food when others are starving raises ethical issues, and so does a decision to teach someone a new pattern of behavior, or to persuade them to adopt a new set of values.[4]

The kind of philosophizing that examines and explores assumptions and questions value consequences of decisions made in regard to other human beings is a vital concern of adult educators.

Philosophical studies in general are of the utmost importance for adult education according to Jerold Apps, a professor of Adult and Continuing Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Apps has argued that adult educators must "become philosophizers" as well as scientists. He has argued that some questions in adult education cannot be adequately answered or answered at all with science, and that some questions in adult education cannot be adequately answered or answered at all with philosophy. The questions that arise in adult education that Apps argues can only be answered by philosophy are:

> (1) questions that deal with ethics or theories of values, (2) questions that deal with epistemology or theories of knowledge, and (3) questions that deal with metaphysics or theories of being or reality.[5]

Questions that arise in adult education that Apps argues can be adequately answered by science, or empirical methods, are "inguisitive" questions or questions of the sort, "How do adults learn?" According to Apps, "inquisitive" questions in adult education are "How to x?" and "What is x?" questions. These are questions that "can be answered with empirical research."

Evaluative questions or questions of the sort, "How should . . . ?" or "What should . . . ?" are questions that arise in adult education that Apps thinks cannot be adequately answered

with empirical studies or at all with empirical studies. Questions of this sort are the concern of philosophy and philosophy alone.[6]

Other adult educators have voiced similar concerns. Some like the late A.A. Liveright have argued that a major problem with adult education is that it lacks a "philosophy and a sense of direction" and that dealing with philosophical problems in adult education is both theoretically and practically important.[7]

Liveright said that without a philosophy of adult education adult educators would continue to "be followers rather than leaders" in the education of millions of adults.[8] He further suggested that in order for adult education to become a discipline among disciplines it has to:

> utilize philosophers and liberal educators, who, in the long run are probably the most practical thinkers to establish a theoretical and practical framework from which adult education can operate.[9]

R.H. Dave has equally expressed the point that philosophy can help to establish a practical and theoretical framework from which the concept of "Lifelong Education" can be understood. According to Dave, the philosophical foundation of lifelong education (adult education) must be studied and reconstructed:

> Lifelong education is itself a value which should be integrated into an internally consistent value system. It is purposive in character and its final goal is to improve the quality of life. The philosophy of life explicit in a given society determines the modality of lifelong education. In one sense, the concept of lifelong education places a great responsibility on the individual to attain the highest possible quality of life throughout his life-span. How far this is

> justifiable and practicable is one important facet of study. But lifelong education is equally concerned with the social good. Is it possible to achieve the social good and simultaneously attain the highest form of self-realization? If so, what principles should govern the design and development of the practical aspects of lifelong education? All these points require systematic study so that philosophical guidelines can be evolved for the development of lifelong learning in a harmonious manner.[10]

More specifically, John Ohliger has described some of the practical and theoretical aspects of studying the ethical dimension of adult education.

In arguing for the use of the "liberal arts" approach in adult basic education (ABE), Ohliger quoted the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which states:

> It is the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty by opening up to everyone the opportunity to live in decency and dignity.[11]

Ohliger argued that men and women cannot live "in deceny and dignity unless they are free; and that the routes of freedom, and hence responsibility, values, and moral existence, is education--adult education. In support of his argument for the establishment of basic education programs by way of the liberal arts approach he further quoted Thomas Davidson, an initiator of the adult education movement who lived over seventy-five years ago, who viewed freedom as the basis of responsibility and morality:

> A free life is the only life worthy of a human being. That which is not free is not responsible, and that which is not responsible is not moral.[12]

Maxwell H. Goldberg has also argued that adult educators

in general, regardless of the level of adult education, are faced with ethical problems that must be answered. He said adult educators must

> encourage continuous education as a way of life--without exercising coercion--however benevolent. Otherwise, in trying to achieve a most laudable objective, we would be violating basic values of the very "way of life" we are seeking to encourage--namely, the person's sense of his own individuality, autonomy, integrity, and wholeness.[13]

In conclusion, a rather long but seemingly appropriate quote sums up the need for philosophical studies in general in adult education, and in particular ethical studies in adult education. R.W.K. Paterson said:

> When, for example, an adult educationist laments the fact (if it is a fact) that adult education classes are attended mainly by 'middle-class' men and women, and exhorts authorities to practice 'positive discrimination' in favor of 'the educationally deprived', underlying his exhortations are definite ethical and political presuppositions concerning individual freedom of choice and social responsibility which need to be brought up into the daylight for critical inspection and appraisal. If, as I have suggested, differences on adult educational policy are in the end ideological differences, it is vital that these ideological factors be identified and investigated. It seems to me, then, that in adult education studies there is still a place, and a major place, for philosophical inquiry of the traditional kind, fraught with methodological difficulties though it may be. While contemporary philosophers of education, have not as yet turned their attention to the philosophical aspects of adult education, no doubt in time some of them will prove very willing to employ their skills of analysis on the adult educational problems which await them. Should they prove unwilling, on behalf of adult educationists, to identify and appraise the metaphysical (non-empirical) world views, the moral principles, and the broad social philosophies which support and underwrite the value-judgments we make in adult education, then presumably adult educationists will have to undertake this task, as best they can, for themselves.[14]

(2) The Personal Point-Of-View Of The Researcher

Research is a human activity. As such it must at some point begin with the ideas, reasoning, and experience of the researcher; the researchers point-of-view.

The need for studying the ethical dimension of adult education from the researchers point-of-view is based on his argument with the arguments given by Paterson, Lawson, Oryshkewych, and Peters who argue that the definition of education in general and adult education in particular, as "individual and social betterment," necessarily implies ethics.

Paterson,[15] and Lawson,[16] for example, argue that the views adult educators hold about adult education come from their political, ethical, religious, and philosophical views about society and their relationship to it. In this sense, they argue that ethics is necessarily part of what is meant by adult education.

Peters[17] has similarly argued that ethics and education in general are inseparable concepts. Peters, for example, has argued:

> That educational issues should give rise to ethical questions is not a contingent matter; for the analysis of the concept of "education" . . . shows why this must necessarily be the case. "Education" has notions such as "improvement," "betterment," and "the passing on of what is worthwhile" built into it. That education must involve something of ethical value is, therefore, a matter of logical necessity. There is however, no logical necessity about the particular values ascribed in particular societies to the variable of "being worth while." The justification of such values, too, must go beyond the realm of conceptual analysis into that of ethical theory.[18]

Oryshkewych[19] agrees with Peters on this point, but does so in a more general way. For example, he says ethics is needed to help people understand all facets of life; social, political, economical, and educational. He says all these problems are intertwined and cannot logically and realistically be discussed and examined independent of each other. For Oryshkewych, ethics is strongly demonstrated in the definitions which scholars create and students learn, and that ethics has its beginnings in departments of education where methods are "determined most correct."[20] Thus, from this researchers point-of-view, adult educator cannot realistically ignore the ethical dimension of their profession without also ignoring adult education altogether.

(3) and (4) The Point-Of-Views of Some Professors and Practitioners of Adult Education

The point-of-views of some professors and some practitioners supported the personal point-of-view of the researcher that ethical studies are indeed important in adult education and that the ethics of adult education should indeed be explored.

Responses about the need for ethical studies in adult education were obtained from these two groups by sending them a questionnaire.

The Need Questionnaire

The questionnaire was mailed to twenty-five professors and twenty-five practitioners. The professors were selected from the ADULT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (U.S.A.) DIRECTORY OF PROFESSORS OF ADULT EDUCATION (1977) on the basis of two

criteria: (1) their writings on the philosophy of adult education, and (2) recommendations from professors of the Department of Continuing and Vocational Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

The practitioners, on the other hand, were randomly selected from the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN EXTENSION COMMUNITY PROGRAM FACULTY DIRECTORY (1977-78). A state directory was used rather than a national directory because a national directory was not at the time available.

A mailed questionnaire was used rather than another method because of its feasibility in terms of time and money. The number of survey respondents were determined by the financial ability of the researcher to underwrite the expenses of the survey.

Both the professors and the practitioners were asked to respond to four open ended questions: (1) How would you define ethics as you perceive its relation to adult education?; (2) What sorts of ethical problems do you perceive in adult education?; (3) In what ways do you think an ethical study would be significant to adult education?; and (4) Which of the following do you think are worth researching in adult education: (a) freedom, (b) responsibility, (c) accountability, (d) values, and (e) human dignity.

Survey Results

Of the fifty questionnaires sent to both the professors and the practitioners, nineteen were returned completed: Fifteen

from professors and four from practitioners.

The practitioners who returned the questionnaire completed were primarily employed as coordinators for area extension and adult education programs.

The following responses to the questionnaire items exemplify the responses given by both the professors and the practitioners:

A Professor Of Adult Education

Questionnaire Item #1--Ethics in the context of adult education is the principles governing the conduct of practitioners of the field. A code of ethics should ideally be developed by the members of a profession themselves, rather than having a code imposed upon them from outside. It should be based upon a system of values that describes the aims, purposes, clienteles, strategies, relationships, priorities, and evaluative procedures of the profession vis a vis individuals, organizations, and society.

Questionnaire Item #2--The kinds and degrees of responsibilities that are appropriate for the adult educator to assume versus to help the client to assume. The extent to which it is appropriate for the adult educator to impose his/her perceptions (as representative of society) of the clients needs on the client versus accepting the clients self-perception of needs as valid. The willingness of the adult educator to invite and make non-defensive use of feedback from the client regarding his/her performance. The temptation of the adult educator to use educational means to manipulate the client to predetermined actions or decisions.

Questionnaire Item #3--An ethical study could provide a description of the present state of affairs regarding ethical standards as perceived and practiced by adult educators. A set of guidelines and/or procedures for evolving a consensual code of ethics.

Questionnaire Item #4--I believe a., b., c., d., and e., are areas worth researching.

A Practitioner Of Adult Education

Questionnaire Item #1--Ethics is the science that deals with how human beings fit themselves into the social and natural

order of things in life--enhancing ways, i.e., so that the individual can live in ways that enable him or her to meet all the needs on the Maslow hierarchy, including the need to see other people and the natural world fulfill the potentials of the life cycle. I see that the adult educator should be concerned that all activities he creates are ethical or life enhancing in the sense outlined above.

Questionnaire Item #2--The single greatest ethical problem adult educators in the university settings face in the years of enrollment stagnation ahead is the demand that they mount activities that will keep up the head count and maintain employment of professors, i.e., that they place the narrow institutional need ahead of their general ethical commitment as explained above.

Questionnaire Item #3--I think that every person should learn concern for the vocabulary of ethical discourse. These are the central concerns of life and persons who do not learn to address them inevitably become crippled. I think that the adult educator who does not subject every thing he does to the questions as to whether it is life-serving maintains an essentially hollow and fragile operation.

Questionnaire Item #4--I think adult educators in general need more ethical study. In our liberal education we get alot of aesthetics in literature and art and the critical study thereof, but almost no law, and ethics. Add to this that all of the above are being swamped, if only temporarily, by vocationalism.[21]

Although these adult educators and practitioners of adult education are only a few it seems sufficient that ethics is a large part of what it means to educate adults. To ignore the ethical dimension of adult education is in essence to ignore the situation of adults themselves and thus the fact that what we mean by adult education is "betterment for adults."

Appendix *

The questionnaire used to generate the responses for this study was open ended and rather short, but allowed the respondents to write as much as they wanted on each item. The items were:

1. How would you define ethics as you perceive its relation to adult education?

2. What sorts of ethical problems do you perceive in adult education?

3. In what ways do you think an ethical and existential study would be significant to adult education?

4. Listed below are only several possible existential--the study of human existence--areas of research that may relate to adult education. Please check all the areas you think would be worthy of investigation in adult education, and add any areas not listed here that you think are important in adult education.

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[13]Goldberg, Maxwell H. "Continuous Education as a Way of Life." ADULT EDUCATION. Autumn 1965, p. 4.

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[19]Oryshkewych, Ostap E. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. New York: Philosophical Library, 1966.

[20]Ibid., pp. 73-75.

[21]The other responses can be found in the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FLIES WITH ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION by Russell S. Knudson, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979.

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Chapter 4

Existential Consequences of Mandatory Continuing Education

By Russell S. Knudson[1]

Jean-Paul Sartre never wrote about continuing education issues, but some of his works may shed some light on the MCE question.

For example, in the play The Flies, a philosophical adaptation of the Greek trilogy Oresteia, which Sartre wrote and produced in response to the oppressiveness of the German occupation of France during World War II, he metaphorically but realistically warns us of the existential consequences of any kind of oppressive force. In The Flies he clearly illustrates that any kind of oppressive force not only denies a person his existential freedom, but also prevents him from exercising it.

"The flies," from which the play gets its name, symbolize for Sartre the fear, remorse, and guilt that has overcome the French people at the hand of the Nazis. In other words, "the flies" symbolize the origin and the consequences of oppression. In terms of the MCE issue, "the flies" may be seen as those who support MCE and the consequences of this support for those workers who are affected by it. Metaphorically, Sartre wrote these "flies" were sent by Zeus to continually remind the people of Argos (the Greek god and city upon which Oresteia is based) of their inferiority and their need for greater and greater repentance. MCE can be viewed in much the same way. It is a means to "force" people to think they are inferior with their present educational background and that they "need" more and more education in order to live up to the standards of a changing society set by someone else (Zeus).

For Sartre, such action is existentially unethical because it treats human beings as though their existential freedom were dependent upon the choices made by others. (Zeus, for example symbolizing employers). Sartre responds to this view in at least two places in the play. As the character Orestes, Sartre says "I am my freedom. No sooner had you (Zeus) created me than I ceased to be yours"; and "For who except yourself can know what you really want? Will you let another decide for you?" Applying these passages to MCE, one can see that Sartre would be against it for two reasons: (1) it denies a person his existential freedom by making him feel he "needs" education in order to BE, to rightfully exist in society; and (2) it makes a person dependent upon the decisions of others, concluding that they know what is right for him, thus taking from him his ability to freely act on his existential freedom.

Using Sartre's concept of "situation," which is also illustrated in the play, once can see the broad consequences of promoting MCE. For clarity a diagram is offered which helps to illustrate these consequences:



This cylinder represents the "American human situation." It is composed of five basic dimensions: (a) political; (b) economic; (c) social; (d) educational; and (e) technological. The large circles within the cylinder represent these dimensions. Furthermore, within these dimensions are others dimensions. These are individuals that interact. These individuals are represented by the smaller overlapping dotted circles. The line that runs vertically through all five

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dimensions indicates that they are related in an ecological eco-system sense. That is, any change in one of the dimensions stimulates a change or reaction in all of the other dimensions. For example, the creation of the airplane (technological) stimulated a corresponding change in all four of the other dimensions: educational programs were developed to train people to maintain the equipment; people throughout the country became closer together (social); and new policies (political) were created to finance (economic) the development of air technology. The human situation or the facts of the American society are that these dimensions are never isolated from each other.

With this diagram in mind let's look at the consequences of promoting MCE. MCE not only affects the existential freedom of a few (for example, within a corporation where employees are threatened with dismissal if they do not continue their education by taking night courses or participating in inservice training programs), but the existential freedom of all humans within the American situation. It is not only the employee who feels threatened by having to continue his education but this employee's family as well. When an employee's existential freedom is denied his attitudes change. He loses interest in his job. Friction may develop between himself and his family because he is burdened with studying in addition to his usual work load which may take time away from interacting with his family. In this same sense MCE, which is within the educational dimension of the cylinder, affects the existential freedom of others in the other dimensions of the human situation. They too are soon burdened with the same problems. The promotion of MCE denies all humans within the situation their existential freedom and their ability to express it.

In conclusion, if MCE is promoted and gets a stronghold it will, according to Sartre's concept of "situation" and his concept of existential freedom, lead to a society devoid of human dignity. People will view each other as educational products or products of change rather than as creators of change. MCE is far more than an academic issue or a question of who should or should not be required to participate in "X" continuing education program. It is a question of a person's existential freedom to act as a being with human dignity.

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Chapter 5

AN ANALYSIS OF THREE EVALUATION PROBLEMS IN ADULT EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

If all the adult educators in the world were polled and asked the question, "What is the most important principle of adult education?", it is expected they would answer by saying, "The most important principle of adult education is that the education delivered must be relevant to the NEEDS of individual learners".[1] Assuming adult educators around the world design adult education programs based on the needs of learners then, there are at least three evaluation problems that exist in adult education relative to this principle.

The first problem is whether or not evaluations conducted in adult education are evaluations of programs or evaluations of adult learners. The second problem is whether or not evaluations that are conducted in adult education can be shown to be valid. And, the third evaluation problem present in adult education is whether or not evaluation can in fact be used to improve adult education programs. Although these three problems have distinctive characteristics, they are interrelated. This inter-relationship will become evident as each is analyzed.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, will be to analyze each of these evaluation problems, show their inter-relationship, and to suggest possible avenues of solving them.

I. THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRAM EVALUATIONS

Many adult educators appear to overlook the fact that if an adult education program is derived from the needs of adult learners, or based

on the needs of adult learners, that the educational program derived represents the needs of the adult learners and not the "needs" of someone or a group external to the needs of the adult learners from which adult education programs are derived. Therefore, since adult education programs are representations of adult learner needs, the evaluation of adult education programs must necessarily be evaluations of adult learner needs rather than the educational program derived and created from the needs of adult learners. Therefore, program evaluations in adult education are impossible if not logically related to the value of importance of the needs. Hence, adult educators who claim they can evaluate "adult education programs" are in reality claiming they can evaluate the needs of adult learners from which adult education programs are derived. But, how can an adult learners needs be evaluated when adult educators who subscribe to the NEEDS PRINCIPLE as a method of program planning, and hence program evaluation, are assuming the NEEDS PRINCIPLE is "axiomatic" or unprovable? In other words, "how can the "needs" of adult learners be evaluated when the "needs" of adult learners are assumed?" This problem, therefore, reduces to the problem of "evaluating an assumption". An adult educator can claim for example, that his assumption that needs exist is "good" because the derivation of adult education programs from this assumption have satisfied many adult learners; but this implies that his assumption that needs exist is "good" because it supports his assumption that an adult education program that has been derived from the NEEDS PRINCIPLE has satisfied the "needs" of many adult learners. This further implies that the adult educator who designs adult education programs on an "axiomatic needs principle" can only assume the nature of needs, and therefore can only assume "anything" derivable from the assumption that needs exist, including

evaluations. Therefore, it seems the validity of evaluations can only be assumed and not shown to be valid.

II. THE VALIDITY OF EVALUATIONS

It has already been partially shown that, "if the NEEDS PRINCIPLE is used in adult education that evaluations in adult education must necessarily be assumptions or unprovable", since evaluations can only occur when adult education programs have been derived from the assumed needs of adult learners. Therefore, since evaluations are based on assumptions, they cannot be shown to be valid or invalid empirically, since empirical validity is contingent upon observation and assumptions are not. For example, if I assume X adult learner "needs" Y, I am also assuming it is true that X adult learner "needs" Y. Therefore, assuming an adult learner need exists is assuming it is true adult learner needs exist. If I assume X adult learner does not "need" Y, I am also assuming it is true that X adult learner does not "need" Y. Therefore, in either case I must assume without proof, empirical or otherwise, that it is true that needs do or do not exist. Therefore, evaluations in adult education are neither empirically valid, or logically valid, unless the assumption that "needs" exist can somehow be shown to be valid logically. A possible solution to this dilemma will be presented later.

III. THE IMPROVEMENT OF ADULT EDUCATION PROGRAMS THROUGH EVALUATIONS

The third problem is directly related to the first two, and implies questions about the purpose of evaluations in adult education.

Both Kempfer[2] and Steele[3] for example, have claimed that the main purpose of evaluation in adult education is to stimulate the growth and improvement of adult education programs, but neither Kempfer or Steele have examined evaluations in terms of adult learner growth and improvement.

Both Kempfer and Steele appear to be primarily concerned with "programs", but from (I.) and (II.) it is evident that "program" improvement is contingent upon the "needs" of adult learners, and therefore "program improvement" can only be the improvement of the needs of adult learners. But since evaluations are assumptions, how can assumptions improve anything? From (I.) and (II.) if I assume X program is "good", I am assuming the "needs" of adult learners are "good" since X program was derived from the assumed "needs" of adult learners. Therefore, if I claim the purpose of evaluations in adult education programs, is to stimulate the growth of adult education programs end to improve them, I must claim that the purpose of evaluation in adult education is to "stimulate the growth of adult learner needs, and to improve adult learner needs". But how can evaluations as assumptions, improve learner needs and stimulate the growth of learner needs, when learner needs are assumed? The problem of improving adult education programs through evaluations then, becomes a problem of improving the assumption that adult learner needs do indeed exist, and that these assumed needs can indeed be improved.

Furthermore, implied in problem (III.) is that "improvement" means the addition or subtraction of some part of a program so it more accurately meets the needs of the adult learners from which it was derived. Now, from (I.), (II.) & (III.) this implies an assumed adult learner need can be improved by either "adding" to it or "subtracting" from it, since programs are representations of adult learner needs. But how can an assumed need and an evaluative assumption be improved by "adding" to it or "subtracting" from it?

Although these three problems are tremendously paradoxical, they do, at least, seem partially solvable.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

(I.a.) It does seem quite true that when an adult educator attempts to evaluate a program he is underneath it all attempting to evaluate adult learner needs which he has assumed to be true. Undoubtly, this is paradoxical, but it does seem possible to overcome or at least by-pass this paradox by "evaluating" (a) the STRUCTURES of the derived program, and (b) the INTERACTION between the adult education program that has been derived from the assumed needs of adult learners, and the assumed needs themselves.

Although the CONTENT of adult education programs are derived from the assumed needs of adult learners, and perhaps impossible to evaluate as already pointed out above, the STRUCTURE of adult education programs is not derived from the assumed needs of adult learners. Therefore, it is quite possible to evaluate the STRUCTURE of an adult education program because the evaluation of the STRUCTURE of the program is in no way linked to the assumed needs of adult learners or derived from the CONTENT of the adult education program which is derived directly from the assumed needs of adult learners.

The STRUCTURE of adult education programs is the method or methods that are employed to transmit knowledge, for example, to the adult learner so the assumed needs can be satisfied. Therefore, "program evaluations" in adult education based on the NEEDS PRINCIPLE are only possible if they are evaluations of the methodologies used in adult education programs. For example, if I am assigned to evaluate the worth of an ABE program, it is not possible for me to evaluate the CONTENT of the program since the CONTENT is based on the needs of the adult learners participating in it, but I can

evaluate the methodology or the instructional mode which is used to deliver the CONTENT to meet the assumed needs of the adult learners.

The second possible way to "evaluate" an adult education program, and therefore overcome the paradox of problem (I.), is to evaluate the INTERACTION between the CONTENT of a derived program, and the STRUCTURE or the methodology used in the program. This procedure escapes the problem of evaluations as program derivations, and hence it too is not directly linked to the NEEDS PRINCIPLE.

Evaluating the INTERACTION between the CONTENT and the STRUCTURE of a program is equivalent to evaluating the effects of a particular mode of instruction for transmitting the CONTENT of a program to meet the assumed needs of the learners involved in the program. For example, suppose A is the CONTENT of a program that has been derived from the assumed needs of the participating adult learners, and B is the STRUCTURE (methodology) of the derived program. The CONTENT (A) INTERACTS with the STRUCTURE (B) to yield an observation of the effects of A on B and the converse and observationally demonstrates whether or not A is compatible with B and the converse; and if it is it may be evaluated as "good". If A is not compatible with B, then it may be evaluated as "bad", and therefore should be changed to more accurately meet the CONTENT (B) or the assumed needs of the adult learners.

"Needs" can be shown to exist logically and empirically by examining one's existence. The existential expression, "existence precedes essence"[4] entails the special expression, "I exist, therefore I need", which logically and therefore empirically demonstrates the validity of the assumption that all human Beings have needs. Needs, whatever they are, can only be defined and demonstrated from existence. If human Beings, adult learners, did not exist, there could be no needs. But in existence, which is empirically verifiable,

and therefore logically justifiable, there are "needs". It is not important necessarily that "needs" be defined beyond the knowledge and understanding of one's existence, for to exist, one must need. Therefore, since needs entail existence, and adult education programs entail existence, and evaluations entail adult education programs, and evaluations entail existence, then evaluations entail needs. Therefore, since "needs" are logically and empirically valid, so too are evaluations, since evaluations entail needs.

(III.a.) From the third problem, it does not seem possible to "improve" assumptions regardless of their character, but it does seem possible to "improve" the needs of adult learners, or the CONTENT of an adult education program if "improvement" means the manipulation of the program CONTENT so as to satisfy the "needs of someone or a group external to the CONTENT. Since the program CONTENT is the representation of the assumed need of the adult learners, a manipulation of it by the evaluator will be a manipulation of the assumed needs of the adult learners.

Such a manipulation of the CONTENT and hence the assumed needs of the adult learners for any purposes external to the assumed needs of the adult learners themselves is "unethical" and should not be permitted in adult education. Therefore, although it does seem possible to "improve" the assumed needs of adult learners through the CONTENT of adult education programs, it clearly seems "unethical" and immorally exploitive. Adult educators who support the manipulation of adult learners assumed needs should question their role in adult education.

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Chapter 6

THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENTIAL EVALUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUC ATION

INTRODUCTION

Imagine human existence and meaning without the expressions "good" and "bad." Is it impossible? According to Wheatly it is not.[1] Wheatly claims other expressions could be invented to take their place. Although he claims expressions like good and bad are replaceable, he, as well as this writer, believe human existence and meaning is impossible without evaluations.

The purpose of this paper is to explicate only one possible conception of evaluation as the nucleus of human meaning. This conception shall be called the "Existential Concept of Evaluation."

THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENTIAL EVALUATION

Evaluation is human value judgments about "things" and "conditions" existent in the world. Evaluation is intimately tied to human discrimination and interaction.[2] Without human existence there is no evaluation, and equally, without evaluations there can be no meaning to human life. Evaluation is not causative in this intimate relationship, however. Evaluation does not cause human meaning, rather, through human existence evaluations emerge which give meaning to human life.

On the surface, the conception of evaluation as "human value judgments about 'things' and 'conditions' existent in the world" seems self explanatory, but is it? According to this conception of evaluation I must be evaluating while I am writing this paper, since the ideas which led to this paper were the results of previous human interactions; between myself, fellow colleaques and students. In short, this paper is the result of previous judgments I made which I found to be of "value"; of interest to me. Without prior value judgments this paper could not have emerged, and emerged with meaning. In the process of writing this paper I had to discriminate what I thought to be useful reference material from unuseful reference material. I had to make a "value judgment" about what I thought was useful, or "good" material from which to reference this paper.

"Things" as they related to the production of this paper, then, were the the IDEAS of my fellow colleagues and students collated with mine and the LITERATURE I consulted. Any-"thing" that can objectively be determined then becomes a "thing" as it is used here. A "thing" can be an inanimate object, an idea, that can be verified by observation either through ones own experience, or through the experience of others. A "thing" however, can never be a human. The origin of evaluations is the human, or the "subject". The "conditions" were the INTERACTIONS that occurred between me and my fellow colleagues, students, and the literature consulted. Literature is the object ("thing") of the "condition" because a human can be stimulated by a book or journal article in much the same way as a human; but humans are 'never' "things", but "subjects." Although literature can stimulate one to think and to "value", it is not the origin of values. Although the distinction between a "thing" and a "condition" is clear, the expression "value judgment" is not. The expression "value judgment" can perhaps be better understood (I am making

a value judgment here when I use "better") by examining both the terms "value" and "judgment" in isolation, and then in combination.

A "value" has its origin in the consciousness of human beings only.[3] According to Sartre, the father of French Existentialism, a human cannot "value' a "thing" or another human until he can establish his own subjective experience. To do this a human must first understand that his "existence precedes essence", or in otherwords, that his existence is solely determined by his own consciousness and not the appearance of material objects.[4] "Existence precedes essence" further means that humans are (and must be) the creators of their own nature and therefore must deny the existence and hence influence of a supreme being. According to Sartre, humans create their own existence, and therefore their own "value."[5] Human existance is therefore primordial, and the origin of "values."

According to Sartre's thesis (which I believe is correct), "values" can only originate from humans when they become aware of their own consciousness. "Values" cannot originate from "things" since "things" have no consciousness according to Sartre.[6] "Values" are first formulated in terms of how humans 'discriminate' and relate their experience from and to "things." "Values" then, are the resultant manifestations of inward and outward human reflections; of humans examining the relations of "things" to themselves, not the converse. In this sense, "things" only have "value" relative to human existence. First, humans value themselves, perceive themselves as different from "things", and "value" "things" as objects different from themselves and external to themselves. According to Sartre, I cannot "value" writing this paper until I first understand that my "existence precedes essence", that I am not a "thing" but a "subject" with a consciousness. Then, and only then, can I "value" writing this paper. The meaning this paper has for me, or its

"value", is NOT DERIVABLE from the fact it exists in fact. Its "value" lies solely in terms of my consciousness. This paper has no "value" in and of itself. It is a "thing." As a product of my consciousness it has "value" and meaning for me, but only as a "thing" not another "subject." According to Sartre, no-"thing" can have the "value" and meaning of a "subject", for this would imply "things" are "subjects", and this clearly is false. Therefore, because the origin of "values" are my consciousness, "valuing" or placing value upon other "subjects" and "things", and "conditions", is an extensive action of my consciousness. "Value judgments" are then the results of "valuing" in this sense. Making a value judgment is 'discriminating' a "thing", a "condition", or another "subject" from oneself. Judging any of these as "valuable" is projecting the "value" of oneself onto the "thing", "condition" or "subject."[7] Evaluation then is the act of making value judgments.

Since evaluations cannot exist in a linguistic vacuum they must be a species of claim about the world. Assuming Sartre's conception of evaluation is correct, and that they in fact cannot exist in a linguistic vacuum, then ALL evaluations must exist as linguistic species claims of some kind about a humans conscious understanding of "things", "conditions", and other "subjects" relative to their own existence. Evaluations then, must be propositions of some kind about the world.[8] As propositions they seem to be both "empirical" and "non-empirical."[9] Examine the two propositions, (1) "this paper was typed on an electric typewriter", and (2) "adult education program X will be repeated next semester." Is (1) an empirical propositional claim that only describes the "condition" as to how the paper was typed, or a description of the type of typewriter ("thing") the paper was typed on, or a non-empirical propositional

claim that only judges the value of the typing of the paper and the electric typewriter it was typed on? Or is (1) both empirical and non-empirical in the above senses? If Sartre's conception of evaluation is correct, then (1) seems to be both empirical and non-empirical. In choosing to type the paper on an electric typewriter rather than on a manual, I had to make a "value judgment" about the comparative worth of both the electric typewriter and the manual. Therefore, (1) seems to be evaluative. Proposition (1) also in fact describes the typewriter (as an electric) and therefore the "condition" surrounding the way in which it was typed--it was typed on an electric typewriter. Similarily, proposition (2) is also both empirical and non-empirical. It is empirical in the sense that the expression, "adult education" partially describes the kind of program that is being repeated, and non-empirical in the sense it implies an evaluation has been made that the program in question is "good", "valuable", or "better" than some other adult education program.

All evaluations, according to the Sartrean existential concept of evaluation, are empirical as well as non-empirical propositional claims about "things", "subjects", and "conditions" existent in the world relative to the consciousness of humans. Additionally, these evaluations are the "things" that make human existence meaningful.

Intimately connected with the Sartrean existential concept of evaluation are the concepts of attitude, belief, knowledge, and reason. Since there are so closely related to the Sartrean existential concept of evaluation, it would be remiss not to at least briefly examine them in terms of the explication above. I think a fuller practical and theoretical understanding would be gained by briefly examining them. The following illustrates their relation

to the existential concept of evaluation.



The following questions with examples should adequately demonstrate the integralness of the concepts of attitude, knowledge, belief, and reason, to the existential concept of evaluation:

(a) Is it possible to hold an attitude toward X exclusive of an evaluation of X? Liking X implies some held value of X. For example, if I like dogs, then I must value dogs. The two concepts seem interdependent.

(b) Is it possible to know X and not evaluate X? According to the Sartrean existential conception of evaluation, all propositions about the world must be evaluative, as previously explained. Knowing X is to empirically or non-empirically claim X exists, therefore to know X is to evaluate X; therefore it is not possible to know X and not evaluate X. Once again, the two concepts are interdependent.

(c) Is it possible to believe X (or in X) and not evaluate X? Evaluating any-"thing", "condition", or "subject" presupposes the belief it must

first exist, therefore, it is not possible to believe in X or X without evaluating X. Believing X, and in X, and evaluating X are conversable, therefore, they too are interdependent concepts. Understanding one helps to understand the other.

(d) Is it possible for individual members of a society ("subjects") to interact without making evaluations? Since evaluations, the act of "valuing" originates with the individual human, and there exists approximately four billion of these individuals on the surface of earth, the probability of human interaction is very high; therefore, it is either extremely improbable human interactions could occur without evaluations, or nearly impossible.

(e) Is it impossible to reason about X without also evaluating X? The existential postulate, "existence precedes essence" obviously established the invalidity of asking this question, as well as perhaps questions (a), (b), (c), and (d). According to Sartre, "no-thing" has essence without the existence of the human consciousness.[10] This includes all that is human or created by humans, including the asking of these questions. Therefore, neither "reason" or "evaluations" of any kind could possibly exist without the existence of human consciousness first. Since both "reason" (e.g., thinking and the products of thinking, thought) and "evaluations" depend upon the existence of human consciousness, neither could exist independent of the other. Nor could questions (a) through (e) exist and have human meaning independent of each other, by the same reasoning.

Since evaluation is necessarily a part of human existence, it must be applicable both theoretically and practically, for to deny the applicability of evaluations is to deny human existence.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION

The adult educator who evaluates the performance of X adult learrer(s) on the basis of the existential concept of evaluation must necessarily label adult learner performance as "good" or "bad", as acceptable or unacceptable like any other system of evaluation, but since these labels are related to "performance" only, they cannot lead to the objectification of the adult learner as a "good" or "bad" "thing."

Since existential evaluations emanate from the awareness of the evaluators consciousness, of his own existence as a "subject" rather than a "thing", his evaluations of other "subjects" must necessarily be projections from his evaluations of himself. Therefore, since the adult educator of an evaluator is not a "thing", his evaluations of others can never lead to the objectifications of those he is evaluating. Impersonality is therefore always impossible when basing evaluations on the basis of the existential concept of evaluation, and personality or humaness is always necessarily assured.

Existential evaluations, unlike the more common "utilitarian evaluations"[11] do not result in the quantification of humans as manipulatable "things" or as functions of economic, social, and political utility. Therefore, the existential evaluation of adult learner performance must always be a function of the evaluators existential existence. Therefore, when adult learner performance is evaluated existentially, the adult is always treated as a human rather than a "thing." Existential evaluations of adult learners then, as distinct from their performances, are functional correlates of the evaluators consciousness of himself as a "subject" distinct from "things." Performances in this sense are "things" or products of the adult learners consciousness, not part of it, and only have human meaning and value in the sense that human consciousness produced them.

Existential evaluations also do not lead to the treating of adult learners as functions of social "roles." In the existential sense of evaluation, adults are always treated as "subjects" with consciousness. "Roles" are social structures within society that negate this consciousness.[12] "Roles" are "things" or social abstractions which serve to stratify societies into classes. They are not "subjects." Therefore, adult learners are not "roles", and therefore cannot be evaluated in terms of "roles." If an adult learner is evaluated in terms of the "role" he plays, he is objectified as a "thing" and therefore, is subject to inhumane manipulation. Utilitarian evaluations frequently result in evaluating adult learners from the perspective of the "roles" they fill rather than their existential subjectification. The engineer, for example who participates in a short course on engineering management, is evaluated on the basis of his "role" as an engineer, not on the basis of his existential existence as a human. Perhaps a more common case which generally illustrates the objectification of humans through "roles" is the case where humans transfer their criticisms of an incompetent physician to the human who fills the "role" of a physician. In this case the physician (the role, the "thing") is a superimposition of the human who has training in medicine. Therefore, when the "role" physician is criticized as incompetent, the human who fills the "role" of the physician is equally criticized. If the actions of the "physician" are deemed imcompetent, so are the actions of the human who fills the physician role. The adult educator is similarily evaluated by adult learners. The human who fills the "role" of the adult educator is evaluated in terms of his role. Existential evaluations are devoid of "role" evaluations since existential evaluations are evaluations of "subjects" rather than "things."

The existential postulate, "EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE" literally defines how all evaluations in adult education should be conducted. Adult education

"programs" as well as "adult learners" should be existentially evaluated in terms of this thesis. Adult education programs, according to this thesis are existential "conditions" and "things" rather than functions of economic utility. Since the existence of adult education programs depend upon the participation and interaction of humans filling the roles of adult learners, they must be manifestations of the "subjective" consciousness of each existing human that comprises the program. Therefore, adult education programs should be evaluated as existential "conditions" and "things" that arose out of the interaction of a group of humans (existential beings). Although adult education programs are "conditions" and "things" they are not "things" like rocks that are entirely external to the extential being of humans. Adult education programs are 'creations', human creations; therefore, adult education programs must also be existentially evaluated in terms of the "subjective" consciousness of the humans that comprise it, rather than manipulated and construed as a function of economic, social, and political utility. Therefore, adult education programs also cannot not be quantified and measured as "things" external to the existence of humans.

The Sartrean existential conception of evaluation can only be understood in terms of human consciousness. "Any-thing" a human creates or values is an extension or projection of his existential being, therefore "any-thing" is reducible to the "subjective" existence of humans, not material or the existence of "things" e.g., rocks, trees, etc. external to human "subjective" consciousness. It seems much could be gained in adult education if the concept of existential evaluation were adopted. Existential evaluations cannot replace pragmatic evaluations[13], but pragmatic evaluations do not take into consideration the "subjective" consciouseness of humans, therefore pragmatic evaluations are inadequate as means to evaluate humans on a

humanistic basis. Pragmatic evaluations which are human endeavors are based on the thesis, "If it works it must be right", rather than the existence of humans, however. Pragmatic evaluations are utilitarian evaluations that are appropriate for the evaluation of "things" not created by humans. Existential evaluations are directed towards humans as "subjects" therefore are humanistic. Since adult education is a human endeavor, existential evaluations are necessary, but not sufficient. Since adult education does not exist in an economic, social and political vacuum, pragmatic evaluations are also necessary, but not sufficient. Both kinds of evaluations are interdependent. Both support the other. Without the economic support--a result of pragmatic evaluation--adult education programs could not exist. On the otherhand, without humans adult education could not exist nor could economic support for adult education programs. Pragmatic evaluations, or evaluations of utility, cannot simply be subsumed under existential evaluations or the converse, however.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Wheatley, Jon. "The Concept of Evaluation". American Philosophical Quarterly. 5, July 1968.

[2]"Discrimination" is defined here in the psychological sense to mean "to be aware of differences", and the "process of distinguishing between two objects, or between stimuli". "Interaction" is defined here to mean "a relationship between systems such that events taking place in one system influence events taking place in the other." A system can be a personality in case of human interaction, or a book, journal, etc. Dictionary of Psychology. By J. P. Chaplin. New York: Dell Pub., 1974, p. 139 and 246.

[3]Jeanson, Francis. Less Probleme Moral et La Pensee de Sartre. Paris: 1965, p. 279.

[4]Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Human Emotions. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 13-14.

[5]Kochelmans, Joseph J. Contemporary European Ethics. New York: Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 261-278.

[6]Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press, 1971, pp. 133-158. Sartre discusses the distinction between humans as 'things'--"beings-for-itself" from which values originate--and "beings-in-itself" or 'things' which have no human consciousness or are inanimate objects.

[7]John Dewey also refers to judging in this way in his monograph, The Theory of Valuation. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, University of Chicago Press, 1969.

[8]Conway, David. "Descriptions and Evaluations." Mind, 81, 1972.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. p. 804.

[11]Utilitarian evaluations are based on the principle, "anything is 'good' if it satisfies the greatest number of people." This satisfaction is what gives the thing in question 'utility.' See Baruch A. Brodys' book, Moral Rules and Particular Circumstances. New York: Prentice Hall, 1970 for further explication of utilitarian evaluations.

[12]Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. pp. 33-85.

[13]A pragmatic evaluation is any evaluation based on the principle that any thing is 'good' if it works in practice. Philosophy, by James L. Christian, San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1973, pp. 165-167.

THE CONCEPT OF ETHICAL RIGHT APPLIED TO ADULT EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

There exists a substantial amount of writing on the concept of need in adult education but only a dearth of writing on the concept of human rights to the concept of need as it is employed as the basis of program planning in adult education.

Since one of the first articles appeared in the adult education literature, on the concept of need in adult education in 1956[1] several articles have been written by adult educators but none of these articles mentioned the importance of human rights as a necessary or even ancillary ingredient to planning programs in adult education.

Monette,[2] for example, discussed "Values and the Concept of Need", but he too neglected the concept of human rights. Atwood and Ellis[3] briefly discussed the concept of need as obligations, but they too neglected to discuss the concept of human rights as it specifically relates to the concept of need. Other writers have also written about the concept of need as it applies to planning programs in adult education, but equally none of these have touched on the relationship between the concept of need to the concept of human rights.[4,5,6]

The thesis of this paper is twofold: (a) that the concept of human rights is logically necessary and sufficient to any discussion of needs in planning educational programs in adult education and (b) that adult education cannot exist as an ethical system unless the concept of human rights are taken into account when planning educational programs. The remainder of this paper is devoted to an explication of both these points.

NEEDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Human needs, regardless of how they are defined, necessarily and sufficiently imply human rights, and human rights, regardless of how they are defined, necessarily and sufficiently imply human needs. Human rights are inextricably related.

According to Tranoy:

"Human needs 'generate' human rights, by way of an unrejectable norm which forbids us to forbid, permit, and order actions which are not contingently possible. In everyday and political practice our ideas of what is possible, impossible, and necessary in the field of human action are closely tied to ideas of what human needs and need structures are. Those who shape and change our ideas of human needs, scientists not least, have had important norm-giving functions, in spite of avowals of moral and political neutrality. In the present world questions of human rights are not particularly neutral or value free."[7]

Atwood and Ellis' discussion on "Needs and Obligations" approximate Tranoy's argument that there is a relationship between needs and rights, but they do not carry it far enough. Whereas Atwood and Ellis superficially discuss the connection of needs to obligations or duties which resemble human rights in that when person X has a need he also has a duty of some kind to fulfill this need, Tranoy specifically relates the concept of need for education to human rights. Tranoy has argued that person X who has Y educational need not only has a duty to himself to fulfill this need or the right to fulfil this need, but also implies the educator has a corresponding human right to assure person X fulfills Y: Tranoy has stated:

"The need for education may be used to illustrate all the distinctions involved in my argument. I have called it a vital need, at least up to a point (7 or 9 or n years of school). Beyond that point it has the status of a legitimate need. A vital need for elementary education would give

rise to a 'strict' right to obtain satisfaction. In that case there must be some b (city, state, government) who has *a* duty to make this possible, by building schools and paying teachers, by making elementary education free and compulsory. Everybody else who recognizes the right is under the obligation not to make it impossible for a person to obtain satisfaction, for instance by holding him back from school or by any other means. And there are many.

A legitimate need for higher education generates an equally 'strict' right to seek satisfaction of the need. Thus, some b would have a duty to make possible such search for satisfaction, by offering opportunities, by building and financing universities (etc)--not for all but for some, by not forbidding all private schools, by making available loans and grants, a duty which should (we think) be public rather than private . . . The category of legitimate need-based rights could be summed up in the right to self-realization, an old but resucitated moral concept. The search for self-realization, for satisfaction of needs which are always personal and often specialized, is itself--naturally or even necessarily--a personal, private, even necessarily--a personal, private, even idiosyncratic activity, identifiable as search only as long as it is voluntary and self-imposed. No doubt there is something contradictory in the idea of Smith coercing Jones into realizing himself at gun-point, although in some of our educational practices we may find problematic border territory, coercion by carrot as well as by stick. Smith may help, guide, advise Jones with regard to self-realization. The autonomouse activity of the self that is to be realized is nevertheless fundamental and essential. Therefore the idea of a right to obtain self-realization is slightly absurd. To have the search made possible may be the most we ought to desire.[8]

Although Tranoy refers here to elementary schooling and higher education, his comments have implications for the education of adults. For example, if adult educators plan their educational programs around the needs of learners, they cannot possibly ignore any of the learners 'rights' to seek knowledge or to be educated or the relationship or impact of the adult educators right to help satisfy these learner needs. In other words, needs imply rights and rights imply needs. This is true of the adult educator as well as the adult learner. If the adult educator knows the needs of an adult learner he has as much a corresponding right to help this adult learner to become self-realized, as the learner has the right to seek and obtain self-realization. In essence, it would be 'unethical' or wrong for an adult educator to acknowledge the needs of adult learners and then ignore the learners right to fulfill these needs. It would be equally unethical or wrong for an adult educator to use his role as an educator to coerce an adult learner by dangling a carrot in front of his face as an incentive to change the adult learners needs and hence his rights to conform to those of the adult educator. Both the adult educator and the adult learner have the equal need and right to seek and obtain self-realization, but if the search and attainment of the self-realization implies the subordination of either the adult educator or the adult learner in the face of either, then an alternative approach to the education of adults should be created or found.

The adult educator may agree at this point that he and the adult learner do have equal rights and needs, but disagree that an adult educator does not have the right to change the behavior of an adult learner to conform with the norms of a group or a society. An adult educator may argue here that it is his role and task as an educator to change the behavior of adult

learners for the purpose of building a better society. Surely, the education of adults cannot be seen independently of the harmonious development of society for without this goal there seems to be no point to education; but does the adult educator have the "right" to change the adult learner? How many adult educators ask this question when they plan an educational program? How many adult educators ask the question, "Do I have a need to change the adult learner?" How many adult educators ask themselves any fundamental ethical questions?

My point-of-view parallels Tranoy's. Although adult educators have a right to educate and the need to educate, they do not have the right to manipulate in any way the behaviors or the feelings or the thoughts of adult learners. They may have the 'need' to manipulate the adult learner to conform to some cherished standard, but they do not have the right to manipulate them to conform to this standard. One reason why adult educators do not have the right to coerce or to entice an adult learner to change his behavior with a stick or carrot is the very point I have been making. That is, that all humans regardless of their status have an equal right to seek self-realization so long as this search for self-realization is not at the expense of another. This claim may seem unrealistic, but imagine for a moment a society full of people not caring for their fellowmen. This seems equally unrealistic. If a society attempted to exist on the basis that people had to justify ethicality or morality on the basis of reasons external to the virtue of acting morally and being moral in and of itself, there could be no society and therefore no educational systems since educational systems are subunits of societies.

The following argument offered by Singer illustrates my point:

1. The "should" in the question "Should I be moral?" implies a request for justifying reasons for being moral.

2. Reasons are either moral or non-moral.

3. If the request is for moral reasons, the question is silly because obviously we morally ought to be moral.

4. If the request is for reasons of a non-moral sort, then this implies that one thinks there are reasons which are in a way more fundamental than moral ones.

5. One can't be moral and still think that being moral requires a justification (i.e., that some non-moral reasons are more fundamental than moral ones).

6. But there is something odd about a question which claims to be deciding between two alternatives but which, in its very asking, logically eliminates the possibility that the speaker can opt for one of the alternatives.[9]

I think it can be readily seen from Singer's argument that adult educators must necessarily ask themselves ethical or moral questions, or admit morality is nonsense. Interestingly enough, if adult educators dismiss morality altogether they are trapped since to accept caring for others as non-moral is self-contradictory. Clearly, adult educators must accept the existence of morality and ask moral questions. This is inevitable and by no means escapable. Therefore, all adult educators and all adult learners must act morally with respect to each other. Societies could not exist otherwise nor could educational systems. Now the question arises once again, "Do adult educators have the "right" to manipulate the behavior, thoughts, and feelings of adult learners?" No they do not, for to do otherwise contradicts social life as well as the purpose of education as a means for self-realization. It is also true that adult learners do not have the right to manipulate the behavior of adult educators for the same reasons as previously given. Both adult educators and adult learners as human beings have an equal right to self-realization through whatever means. Having equal rights establishes that neither has the right to manipulate the other. If one did have the right to

manipulate the other according to a particular set of needs--that are not equal--then there could not exist any such thing as an equal right; only unequal rights.

In order for a society to exist in harmony there must be a moral system within the society. A moral system can change with the changing society, but it must always exist. Perhaps its existence is human nature. perhaps it is governed by a supreme being. Whatever the case, morality is an essential part of society and therefore an essential part of all educational systems and those who govern them. It is important to note, I think that morality can change dependent upon a changing society and the needs of people have an effect upon the change in a society's moral system(s) and all people by virtue of their human beingness possess equal rights: but these same people do not possess equal needs. Two people can possess the same right, e.g., the right to self-realization, but possess entirely different needs. Although they possess entirely different needs these needs imply the same right to whatever it is they need. For example, two people X and Y both have an equal right to education, but X may have a need--because of his social status or his psychological history or his economic status--for less education and a different kind of education than Y who has a different social status, psychological history and economic status. Person X for example, may be a business man and only 'needs' education to increase his annual salary. On the other hand, person Y may be a teacher who only feels a 'need' for more education because it will heighten his awareness of social problems. In this case, both X and Y have slightly different kinds of education, but both have an equal right to education.

The equal right(s) to which I have been alluding to here is the "natural right". These rights have been bestowed upon <u>all</u> humans regardless of race

and creed, and are inalienable. In other words, all humans have rights by virtue of the fact they exist. Without "natural rights" or inalienable rights, it seems clear that although a person such as X or Y could have a need predicated by his experience, that he could not satisfy his need because there would be no "right" from which his need could be actualized. Therefore, my argument thus far has been that rights and needs are inextricable. Both Would be senseless and useless concepts unless they necessarily and sufficiently occurred together. In essence, "rights logically necessarily and sufficiently imply needs, and needs logically necessarily and sufficiently imply rights."

IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION

Adult educators and educators in general seem to me to sometimes lose sight of the fact that educating someone is as much a moral or ethical concern as it is an economic, political, psychological, and social concern. Just as rights and needs logically necessarily and sufficiently imply each other, educating a person implies morality.

Educating a person does not occur in a moral vacuum, just as educating a person does not occur in a social, political, or economic vacuum. Regardless what adult educators teach adults they are teaching adults rules of behavior; rules of conduct, or of acting in certain ways relative to that which is being taught. For example, if an adult educator is given the task of teaching a group of adults how to service an automobile engine, he cannot overlook the social fact that servicing an automobile engine is related to the way people feel, and the way they act towards one another and their environment. That is, life is an eco-system composed of all things that are and that the education of adults is but one small but necessary element in this eco-system. Life as an eco-system is composed of the way we treat each

other, it has an inherent moral dimension. Morality then is not simply a part of life but life itself. This is also true of the social dimension, the economic dimension, the psychlogical dimension, and the political dimension of life. All these dimensions and surely more are intimately related to morality and morality to them. John Dewey once said that "education is not preparation for life, but life itself."[10] I should like to modify this to say, "that all the dimensions of life cannot be dealt with independent of the other; that when an adult educator or any educator teaches something, he is in essence teaching all of these dimensions to some degree." Therefore, no educator including adult educators can ignore the importance of the moral dimension of teaching and the moral dimension of planning educational programs since it is from these educational programs that adult educators base their teachings.

Returning to the example of the adult educator teaching adults to service their cars, I think one can see that if these adult learners are not taught the moral implications of servicing their cars or others cars, that they may view car servicing as an unrelated part of moral existence when in fact it is not. These adult learners should be helped to realize, but not coercively, that proper car servicing has an effect upon the environment and this in turn has an effect upon the way people treat each other. We know for example that air pollution may cause or at least contribute to the cause of certain kinds of cancer. Assuming this is true, improperly servicing an automobile engine is a moral concern. Teaching automobile engine servicing to adult learners then, has an element of moral education as does the teaching of anything else.

According to Scriven moral decisions and actions are like needs in that they are part of living itself, and therefore are inescapable.

I believe as does Scriven that the distinguishing feature of a moral system is a system that provides humans with a code of conduct based on unselfishness. Scriven claims a moral code must be dominant in a society and that "any justification of morality must justify its claim to priority over matters of manners, codes of honor, traditions, and laws. Scriven further claims a community is a moral system. He says:

"We shall call a community (or an attide, a system of laws, etc.) moral insofar as it accepts the principle that every person has equal rights (and the rational conclusions from this and the relevant facts). To "have equal rights" is to have an equal CLAIM to consideration, and a society with this commitment can justify divergencies of ACTUAL consideration only when these can be shown to be required in order better to serve claims at all. This apparently paradoxical notion is best explained by exhibiting practical examples. It may, for example, be thought of in terms of an analogy with the voting rights of the legal partners in a business. These are basically equal rights and are inalienable in that they cannot be bought and sold as such: they must always be exercised by the partner to whom they belong."[11]

Although Scriven does not discuss human needs in this example. I think they are implied. Analogously, adult education is also implied necessarily as a moral community. For example, adult educators would be extremely remiss if they treated adult learners "unequally"' or differentiated between the rights of adult learners. Adult educators who do differentiate between the rights of adult learners must admit according to Scriven's position, if they accept it, that they are immoral and that they are educating adult learners on immoral principles rather than on moral principles. Therefore, if adult education is to be a moral system there can not be a differentiation of

adult learner rights. All learners have "equal rights" and 'must' be treated as such. These rights, it seems, according to my understanding of Scriven's position are equivalent to the concept of need insofar as needs also are inalienable in the sense that all humans have needs of some kind or another. As I previously mentioned, human needs can be different in type or degree, and can change; but like rights they cannot be bought or sold and necessarily and sufficiently imply rights and the converse. And, to modify Scriven's words a bit, "to have needs is to have an equal right to claim consideration, and a society, in this case adult education, with this commitment we can justify divergencies of actual consideration only when these can be shown to be required in order better to serve claims at all". Without recognizing the concept of human rights and needs as inalienable inextricables necessary for life, adult educators necessarily are promoting an unequal, selfish, immoral society or educational community. Regardless of the educational background, the financial background, the feelings or thoughts of either the adult educator or the adult learner, as humans adult educators and adult learners have equal rights and needs of some sort or other. And these inalienable rights, to life and the pursuit of happiness, for example, have no meaning unless one's needs are not taken into consideration.

Imagine what adult education would be like or a society of any kind where the inalienability of human rights were recognized but needs were not? Also, imagine the converse of this. Is it possible? I think not.

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[11] Scriven, Michael. PRIMARY PHILOSOPHY. New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1966, pp. 238-39.

Chapter 8

A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE FOR THE EDUCATION OF THE OLDER AMERICAN ADULT

"Learning is but an adjunct to our self, and
where we are our learning likewise is".
--Shakespeare, Love's Labour's Lost

INTRODUCTION

The older American adult has been relatively neglected by researchers of Education, Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology until only recently. One need only look to the professional journals to confirm this relatively recent development in research. The Journal of Educational Gerontology, for example, is only one of several now existing journals that devote space to discussions of the status of the older American adult in the American society today.

The same has been true in philosophy. Prior to the few articles written in the past several years by Kallen,[1] Kuypers,[2] Byrne,[3] and seven others,[4] virtually no other works exist to the knowledge of this writer on using philosophy as a method of analysis to deal with the problems of the aged in contemporary America.

The result of this paper should contribute, at least in a meager way. to the building up of the philosophical literature on aging, and as well provide educational gerontologists and the adult educator who is interested in the education[5] of the elderly[6] with a convincing ethical argument that supports the proposition:

> "Older American adults have as much right and need to be educated as the younger American adult and the American child."

Although the frame of reference of this paper is the older American adult, it seems reasonable that the arguments presented in this paper apply equally to all humans regardless of age, geographical location, social status or culture, since all humans, by virtue of the fact they are humans, possess the inalienable right and have the "inalienable need" to be educated. This point will be argued in the remainder of this paper.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The concept of human rights is very complicated, and it is not possible to deal with all of its ramifications in this paper, therefore only two dimensions of the concept will be examined in reference to the education of older American adults. These two dimensions are here labelled "Natural rights"[7] and "Special rights"[8].

"Natural rights" are those rights that all humans possess by virtue of their existence as humans. For example, all humans by virtue of the fact they exist as physical organisms have the inalienable right to food in order to sustain life. In this sense a "Natural right" is a 'biological right.' Another example of a "Natural right", and one of greater concern in this paper, is the inalienable right to utilize one's cognitive capacities and one's sensory capacities. In this sense a "Natural right" is a 'psychological right.' It should be kept in mind that in general "Natural rights" are not ascribed or attained through achievement, but exist only by virtue of being human. It should also be kept in mind that "Natural rights" cannot be taken away, since they are inalienable. They can however be violated.

"Special rights" on the other hand, are ascribed or achieved rights and therefore can be granted or revoked according to some man made criteria.

An example of a "Special right" is the right to use the Elks Club on Saturday night. Another example of a "Special right" is the right to teach professionally. Teaching may seem to be a "Natural right", but in order to teach professionally one must hold a license to teach, and this license can be revoked upon misbehavior of the teacher according to a set of standards set by the license granting agency. In this sense, right is defined as a license that can only be granted if one abides by a certain rule or rules.

"Natural rights" and "Special rights" are not mutually exclusive, however. For example, all humans have the "Natural right" to life, but not all humans have the "Special right" to use the Elks Club or to hold teaching credentials. Some people of the same age also have different "Special rights". For example, two persons, "A" and "B" both have the "Natural right" to utilize their sensory and cognitive capacities, but "A" may have the "Special right" to attend X school but not Y school because "A" may not have the money to attend Y school or the grades ("Special rights" in themselves) to attend Y school; whereas "B" does.

In this case, as in the case of all humans, both "A" and "B" have identical "Natural rights" but unequal "Special rights" as defined by grades that are granted and money that is granted. In this case grades and money become the criteria of the "Special rights" given to both "A" and "B". In a negative sense, "A" has "Special rights" prohibiting attending Y school and "B" has "Special rights" permitting him/her to attend Y school. The relativity of "Special rights" can further be seen in terms of occupation.

Both "A" and "B" may be employed by the same company, hold the same academic degree, earn the same salary, and have the same number of years of experience, but "A" may have 'rights' that "B" does not, and the converse. For example, "A" may have the "Special right" to sit in on management decisions whereas "B's" presence is prohibited. Similarly, "B" may be given the "Special right" to the use of the company car, whereas "A" must use his/her own while working on company time.

The distinction between "Natural rights" and "Special rights" may also be made according to the 'quality' of a person's cognitive and sensory capacities. For example, person "A" and person "B" may be equal in every respect except the 'quality' of their cognitive and sensory capacities. Person "A" may have a 'special' aptitude to solve abstract problems whereas person "B" does not. The result of "A" possessing this special aptitude may give him the "Special right" to become a mathematician, whereas it does not give person "B" an equal "Special right" to become a mathematician because he does not have the same 'special' aptitude as "A". Both "A" and "B" however, regardless of their differences and similiarities possess the same "Natural right" or 'psychological right' to utilize their cognitive and sensory capacities regardless of their distinctive qualities. Regardless of the social, political, and economic differences between "A" and "B" that define their respective "Special rights" they both have the same "Natural rights" by virtue of the fact they are both humans. In this sense, "Special rights" may interfere with the exercising of one's "Natural rights" but "Special rights" cannot be instrumental in taking one's "Natural rights" away. "Natural rights" will always exist as long as the human race exists, and they are unchanging over time. "Special rights" on the other hand, may

change across time according to social change, political change, economic change, and any other change that is created by man in order to control his environment.

An integral question that may be raised at this point is, "What is the source of "Natural rights" and "Special rights"? The answer to the latter part of this question has already been answered in the foregoing discussion. "Special rights" are created by humans. The answer to the foremost part of the question, "What is the source of 'Natural rights' may be impossible to answer, at least in the empirical sense which the latter part of the question can be answered about "Special rights".

Some philosopher's and theologians like St. Anselm and St. Augustine, and Decartes, argued the source of "Natural rights" was God.[9] Contemporary theologians and some philosopher's continue to agree with their arguments. John Cobb, for example, a natural theologian and philosopher argues there is a natural order to the human universe which is responsible for "Natural rights".[10] Eastern mystics equally argue that Karma is the source of "Natural human rights".[11] None of these views can be established empirically however, so it looks as though we will never 'know' the source of "Natural rights" other than in a private intuitive way, or through some logical system created to explain all those things not explainable by science, and therefore will not be able to refer to "Natural rights" or 'expressions of Natural rights' in defense of human actions?

According to Benjamin L. Whorf and Edward Sapir however, "Natural rights" are as defensible as scientific fact. According to both Whorf and Sapir, human reality is manifested in language and anytime a person utters an expression of the sort, "I have the right to X", regardless of whether the expression refers to "Natural rights" or "Special rights" as stipulated

above, the person has referred to a 'reality' in the same sense as the scientist who writes or utters an equation or formula which is intended to explain "X is the case".[12]

According to both Whorf and Sapir:

> Human beings do now live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group . . . . . We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.[13]

Assuming Whorf's and Sapir's research is correct, the expression, "I have the right for or to X", is an empirically defensible as any scientific expression. Whorf and Sapir's point is that all of human reality is manifest in language. Therefore, any expression used and created by man regardless if it is called 'scientific' or not, expresses and refers to a verifiable reality. According to Whorf and Sapir then, the source of "Natural rights" is language; the source of all human reality. "Natural rights" can then be defended on the basis of language and the functions of language relative to expressions, "I have the right to X".

THE LINGUISTIC FUNCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS[14]

When people use the expression, "I have the right to or for X", they imply at least four very real conditions:

(1) that X person has a 'reason' for doing Y or a 'justification' for doing Y where Y is a judgment, decision, or an action of some kind;
(2) that X person is 'free' to do Y, where Y is a judgment, decision, or an action of some kind;
(3) that Z person is 'obligated' to help X person exercise Y, where Y is a judgment, decision, or an action of some kind; and

(4) that X person is 'entitled' to the gratification of a corresponding need, desire, or wart.

Taking into consideration Whorf's and Sapir's argument and the four functions of the expression, "I have the right (natural right) to or for X", the following argument can be constructed in defense of the proposition, "older American adults have as much right to education as yourger Americans":

Both young American's and older American's share the same existential quality: 'humaness.' By virtue of holding this same existential quality, both have (natural) rights. Therefore, given the fact they share the same existential quality, and the fact that they both have (natural) rights, claiming young American's have the inalienable right (natural right) to education necessarily implies older American's equally have the same right to education.

This argument, based on the empirical nature of language according to Whorf and Sapir, clearly seems to show that older American adults by virtue of their existential identity with the human nature of younger American's have as much right to education as do younger American's; and to deny one is to deny the other.

It seems clear then, that if younger American's have the "right" to education, older American's <u>necessarily</u> have the same right.

A dimension of human rights should be mentioned at this point that seems critical to making sense of the fourth linguistical function of human rights as stated above. This is the dimension of "need".

THE CORRESPONDING FUNCTION OF "NEED" TO HUMAN RIGHTS[15]

The fourth linguistical function of human rights, specifically, "Natural rights", was stated as "X person is entitled to the gratification of a corresponding need, desire, or want", but this statement does not tell what this need is or how it is related to human rights. It seems reasonable then to further explicate what it means.

Before attending to this explication, it should be mentioned that the concept of need is as complex a concept as human rights and only a brief account of it can be given in this paper. It should also be pointed out that although a discussion of the relationship of desire and want to "need" would perhaps also be fruitful in gaining a better understanding of the nature of the fourth linguistical function of human right in the natural sense, only a brief discussion of the relationship of need to rights can be given here. A further discussion will be left for a future paper.

In the Whorfian and Sapirian sense, "need" is as much a linguistical reality as "right" (Natural right especially). Each time a person claims to "have the right to or for X" they inevitably are also claiming they "have a need to claim they have a right to or for X". For example, if person W claims s/he has the right to food to sustain life, s/he is also claiming s/he has the need for food. It also seems true that if person W claims s/he has the right to utilize his/her cognitive and sensory abilities that s/he possesses by virtue of being human, s/he is also claiming s/he has the need to utilize his/her cognitive and sensory abilities as s/he possesses

by virtue of being human. The converse also seems true, i.e., to claim one has a need by virtue of being human claims one has a right by virtue of being human.

To claim a need then is to claim a right, and to claim a right is to claim a need. It also seems true that to "have a need" is to "have a right" and the converse. If Maslow is correct in his observations of human needs, that needs are innate to all humans,[16] and Whorf and Sapir are correct, that language is human reality, then it seems to follow that "need" serves the same functions or at least corresponding functions as rights. Given this, the corresponding linguistic functions of "need" seem to follow:

(1a) that X person has a 'reason' for doing Y or a 'justification' for doing Y where Y is a judgment, decision, or an action of some kind;

(2a) that X person is 'free' to do Y, where Y is a judgment, decision, or an action of some kind;

(3a) that Z person is 'obligated' to help X person exercise Y where Y is a judgment, decision, or an action of some kind.

Similarily, these linguistic functions seem to imply another argument similar to the one presented earlier:

Both young American's and older American's share the same existential quality: 'humaness.' By virtue of holding this same existential quality, both possess (natural) needs. Therefore, given the fact they share the same existential quality, and the fact that they both possess (natural) needs, claiming young American's have the "need" (in this sense) for education necessarily implies older American's equally have the same need for education. Given this corresponding

argument, it seems clear that in terms of human need it also follows as it did for human rights that older American adults necessarily have the same rights (natural rights) and needs (natural needs) for education that younger American's have, by virtue of the fact older American's and younger American's share the same human nature.

The question can now be asked, "Why then aren't older American's receiving the same educational opportunities for education that younger American's are presently receiving?"

Those who claim older American's have had their chance for education and did not take it, or who claim there is not enough money to go around so older American's can be educated, or who claim society has no obligation to provide education opportunities for older American's, or who claim older American's have too short of a life expectancy to warrant educational opportunities, MUST then also claim younger American's MUST be denied educational opportunities, since both older American's and younger American's share the same human nature or existential quality, and thus the same "natural rights" and the same "natural needs" as humans.[17] To deny older American's of education then, is to necessarily deny younger American's of education regardless of any scientific evidence or economic or social condition that suggests the older American should be neglected and the younger American favored. It is clearly unethical to deny older American's of education or any American of education and to compare humans on a comparative-competitive basis in terms of education and in terms of one's "natural rights and needs" which all humans possess by virtue of the fact they are human.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Kallen, Horace. "Philosophy, Aging and the Aged". JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, 6, 1-21, Winter 1972.

[2]Kuypers, Joseph A. "Aging: Potentials For Personal Liberation". HUMANITAS, 13, 17-38, Fall 1977.

[3]Byrne, Edmund. "Death and Aging in Technopolis: Towards a Role Definition of Wisdom". JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, 10, 161-177, Fall 1976.

[4]Although other articles may exist on the philosophy of aging, I could only find seven others:

Hustedde, Germaine. "Authentic Living--Graceful Aging". HUMANITAS, 13, 53-68, Fall 1977.

Weisman, Avery D. "Does Old Age Make Sense?". HUMANITAS, 13, 111-120, Fall 1977.

Hoffman, Adeline M. "Fullfillment in The Later Years". HUMANITAS, 13, 5-16, Fall 1977.

Leach, Edmund. "Society's Expectations of Health". MEDICAL ETHICS, 1, 85-89, July 1975.

Pucectti, Roland. "The Conquest of Death." MONIST, 59, 249-263, April 1976.

Koumakis, Georgios. "Aristotle's Opinions on Old Age From a Social Point of View". PHILOSOPHIA, 4, 274-285, 1974.

Henricks, C. D. "Historical Development of the Multiplicity of Times and Implication For The Analysis of Aging." HUMAN CONTEXT, 7, 117-129, Spring 1975.

[5]Throughout this paper "education means: "the cultivation, culturing, and the development of one's cognitive and sensory abilities so he/she can adapt to his/her environment".

[6]Throughout this paper "older American adult" means any American sixty-five years of age or older who has been and presently is educationally neglected by the American society. Although this definition is arbitrary in the sense that no one has clearly and definitely conceptualized the concept of old or adult, it serves the purposes of this paper in establishing arguments in defense of education for the elderly in the way many people in America seem to view an old person.

[7]For a further more in depth discussion of "Natural rights" see H.L.A. Hart's article, "Art There Any Natural Rights". PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 64, 175-191, 1955.

[8]For a further discussion on the concept of "Special rights" see the article, "Duties, Rights, and Claims". by Joel Feinberg, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 3, 1966; and Maurice Cranston's book, "What Are Human Rights"? New York: Basic Books, 1962.

[9]In the traditional sense, these theologians and philosophers argued human existence was caused by God, and hence the implication results that any rights claimed by humans must originate in God's will, not human will. Therefore, they implied all human rights regardless of their human definition have their source in God. This position, of course, makes it difficult if not impossible to use in defending the proposition posed on page 2 of this paper.

[10]Cobb, John. "Christian Natural Theology Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead." Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1979.

[11]Mukheyi, S. R. "Karma and Sannyasa--A Linguistical Approach". INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 38, 37-40, April 1965.

[12]Carroll, John. (ed.) "Language, Thought and Reality": Selected Writings of Benjamin Whorf. MIT Press, 1966.

[13]Ibid. p. 134.

[14]The linguistic functions discussed here are modifications of the functions of rights discussed by Bertram Bandman in his article, "Some Legal, Moral, and Intellectual Rights of Children". EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 27, 1977.

[15]The corresponding functions of needs discussed here is a modification of the functions discussed by Knut Erik Tranøy in his article, "Ought Implies Can: A Bridge From Fact to Norm". RATIO, 17, 147-175, 1975.

[16]Maslow, Abrham. "Toward a Psychology of Being". New York: D. Van Nostrand & Company, 1968.

[17]Current issues concerning these disjuncts can be read about in the 1971 White House Conference on Aging paper titled, "Background and Issues on Education", written for the White Conference on Aging by Howard McCluskey, Professor emeritus, the Department of Education, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Chapter 9

Llessur Nosdunk's Theory of Alienation Related to Adult Education

In the late twentieth century the unknown Russian adult educator, Llessur Nosdunk, described and explained the socio-educational alienation of the Nacirema. In a two volume compendium that was found in the ruins of an old one room school house near Madison, Wisconsin, he delineated his theory. In the first volume he presented what appeared to be a comprehensive model of the socio-educational alienation of the Nacirema. In the second volume he presented what appeared to be a possible educational framework to "dealienate" the Nacirema in terms of a national adult education program.

The purpose of this monograph is merely to present in summary these two volumes as they originally appeared.

VOLUME #1

Presented below is the first comprehensive model which appeared in Llessur Nosdunk's two volume compendium.



A_p=alienated product

For Llessur Nosdunk this model reflected the socio-educational alienation of the Nacirema during the late twentieth century. According to Nosdunk this model explained the "process" of alienation in the Nacirema society.

Nosdunk defined alienation as

> a mode of experience in which the Nacirema experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship. The alienated Nacirema is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any other Nacirema. He, like the others, are experienced as things are experienced; with the senses and with common sense, but at the same time without being related to oneself and to the world outside productively.[1]

Nosdunk claimed that every Nacirema was alienated. According to him, alienation applied to social and political, economic and ethnic, racial and religious minorities, as well as to the young and the old, the distinguished citizens, and the maladjusted, truly sick people of the Nacirema society.

The alienated Naciremas were those people who had been excluded or who had excluded themselves. They were the thousands of bored workers who found that what they were doing was monotonous or degrading or both. They were the young Nacirema who either committed "senseless acts of violence" or simply "didn't care about anything" or who "cared about everthing, too much". They were the idle, the lonely old who felt the world had left them behind, and the rejectors of prevailed values of the Nacirema culture. They were also the achievers--the "special ones" who strove so hard for recognition that they found everyone else somewhere off to the side of their own lives. Moreover, they were the deeply maladjusted--the escapists, retreatists, nihilists, disparates and disperates, the dope addicts, the insane, the criminals and the self-destroyers.

Llessur Nosdunk described many alienated Nacirema in Volume One of his two volume compendium. He observed many young high school and university

students who shared this students sense of valuelessness:

> If I had been brought up in Nazi Germany--supposing I wasn't Jewish--I think I would have had an absolute set of values, that is to say, Nazism, to believe in. In Modern Nacirema society, particularly in the upper middle class, a very liberal group, where I'm given no religious background, where my parents always say to me, "if you want to go to Sunday School, you can," or "If you want to take music lessons, you can," but "It's up to you," where they never did force any arbitrary system of values on me--what I find is that with so much freedom, I'm left with no value system, and in certain ways I wish I had had a value system forced on me, so that I could have something to believe in.[2]

Equally pervasive and illuminating were Nosdunk's case study descriptions of Nacirema who experienced little freedom, but a great deal of force:

> For myself, the Nacirema society and others can go to Hell. If they have something worth while to say, I'll listen, but most often society has only a mold to force you into, destroying rather than creating.[3]

Although Llessur Nosdunk observed many faces of alienation, he found them to originate from the same source and transmitted in the same way.

Nosdunk observed technocracy as the source of all alienation, and the Nacirema educational system or school system as the medium from which it was transmitted. According to Nosdunk, the Nacirema school system was created by the technocrats to control the masses so they would produce only what was necessary to maintain the technocratic power structure.[4]

The Nacirema technocrats used the Nacirema school system in three ways to produce alienation in the masses. First, they used the school system to perpetuate their--the technocrats--materialistic values of technology. They used the school system as a means to teach every Nacirema that the study, analysis, and use of technology was the only way they could attain meaning in life. Secondly, they used the school system as a means to control the Nacirema by manipulating them into thinking they <u>needed</u> the economic, political, and social support of the technocrats in order to survive and achieve

success in the Nacirema society. Thirdly, the technocrats used the Nacirema school system to create a degree of competitiveness in the Nacirema they could not cope with without the advice of the technocrats. In this sense the technocrats created a "sponsorship" school system that provided only those Nacirema they thought worthy with the opportunities for success in terms of technocratic ideology. Education in the Nacirema society was technocratic enslavement. It was a technocratic means to exploit the masses for technocratic gain. The Nacirema school system claimed to free the Nacirema from the bondage of ignorance but it incarcerated them instead in the ideology of the technocrats. A result of this technocratic enslavement was alienation. Alienation from oneself, from others, and from nature. Those Nacirema who were not "sponsored" by the technocrats usually felt excluded from the Nacirema society and were driven by their frustration to violence, suicide, drugs and other forms of maladjustment.[5]

Another level of alienation Llessur Nosdunk attributed to the technocratic use of the Nacirema school system stemmed from the technocratic ideology that promoted a separation between schooling and nature. Educational activities in the elementary schools and the high schools were developed by the technocrats to appease the Nacirema children, to appeal to their fantasies, and to reinforce the creation of analytical strategies that served no purpose other than to provide the children with social and emotional rewards that supported technocratic ideals. Students were taught incredible absurdities about work, politics, cultural activities, and interpersonal relationships. They were discouraged when they raised ecologically relevant issues that were not supported by the technocrats. They were discouraged to realistically examine the structure of employment. They were not led to question the legitimacy of work efforts which depleted the earth of its

scarce resources without improving the quality of life. They were not stimulated in invent new criteria to assess the work activities nor were they intellectually prepared to suggest new kinds of work to replace the activities that were destructive. Rather then providing the Nacirema children with humanistic educational activities, they were provided with activities that were efficient; that promoted production for the technocrats.

The instructional methods created by the technocrats to control Nacirema children were all based on efficient production or were a function of time. During the preschool, elementary, and high school years the Nacirema children were taught to place time schedules before human interaction. They were punished for neglecting to observe standardized time schedules, and ignored for interacting with others unless permitted to do so. They were persecuted by both teachers and parents who were previously alienated by the technocrats, for not being punctual to socially assigned adult events.

Llessur Nosdunk observed that as the Nacirema children progressed in the Nacirema school system they became progressively alienated. As university students they experienced advanced levels of technocratic control. University professors, who were also products of technocratic control, used the same technocratically sanctioned teaching methods the elementary and high school teachers used except they accelerated the transmittal of subject content which increased the Nacirema students frustrated awareness of time and its relation to production or competition. As compared with the alienated elementary and high school teachers, the Nacirema university professors likewise only rewarded students for their skill in analyzing concepts and creating rational strategies to solve unrealistic academic problems.

The social and emotional lives of the Nacirema university students were as well alienated dimensions of their personalities. They spent the majority

of their evening hours playing sophisticated social role games designed to exploit a Nacirema of the opposite gender. Most of the time these games were played in beer pubs within large groups of other alienated students since this was the only social environment they could function in. Nosdunk observed that alienated university students were of two types: (1) those that were intolerable to groups but socially and emotionally needed the companionship of a group, and (2) those that clung to groups but could not function within them. Both of these types had an affinity for group support, but neither could function within a group. They both simultaneously feared and needed group support. According to Nosdunk they were bound for a life of distress. Many became alcoholics, drug users, "social dropouts", etc.. In the Nacirema society no one escaped the alienating grips of the technocratic school system; and it seemed the more a Nacirema progressed in the school system, and the older he became, the more alienated he became. As the Nacirema grew older and older in the Nacirema society the more solidified his alienated personality became.

Based on Llessur Nosdunk's statistics, the incidence of mental disorders as a consequence of alienation figured prominently among the causes of the Nacirema society's problems with social turbulence, crime, and civil unrest.

In many Nacirema cities during the mid and late twentieth century it was reported by Nosdunk that from sixty to seventy percent of the elementary school aged Nacirema children required treatment for severe emotional and social difficulties. It was further reported during that time by the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children that at least 1,400,000 of the Nacirema children under eighteen years of age were yearly in need of immediate psychiatric care.[6]

Nosdunk further showed during the same time span, that the Nacirema society was composed of well over 100 million Nacirema, nearly one-half of the Nacirema society, who were borderline schizophrenics or exhibited other deviant mental behaviors that threatened the stability of the Nacirema society. He further claimed that eighty percent of the Nacirema admitted to having played with suicidal ideas, and that at least once every minute a Nacirema tried to kill himself and once every 24 minutes the attempt was successful. Approximately ten to fifteen percent of these attempts were made by university students.[7] Furthermore, according to Nosdunk, alcoholism equally threatened the stability of the Nacirema society. Nosdunk's records showed there were well over 11 million Nacirema with a serious drinking problem, or about one of every 22 Nacirema had a drinking problem that cost the Nacirema society, in tax money, ten billion dollars a year.[8]

Regardless of occupation or occupational level every Nacirema was infected with an alienated personality. The only difference among the Nacirema was the degree each was alienated. Every Nacirema educator from preschool to and through the university promoted alienation. They had to in order to preserve their jobs. They could not deviate from the educational rules laid down by the technocrats. By the time a Nacirema reached the teaching occupational level it was highly improbable he could change his alienated condition anyway, so he agonizingly conformed to the "normal" alienated majority.

The Nacirema adult eductor, like every other Nacirema educator, forced alienated conformity onto every student they had contact with. They taught their adult students to be "normal", to follow the trends of society. They educated the adult Nacirema to lose themselves and to become absurd like

every other Nacirema, and thus to be "normal." "Normal" Nacirema killed 100,000,000 of their fellow normal men during the first fifty years of the twentieth century, but the Nacirema adult educator still continued to perpetuate the technocratic status quo.[9]

The Nacirema adult educator unknowingly promoted alienation by responding to the needs of the "normal" Nacirema. The "needs" of the "normal" Nacirema were in response to the alienated social structure of the Nacirema society and to other alienated Nacirema, therefore the adult educator was responding to the "needs" of the technocrats who stimulated alienation in the masses, and were not responding to the "needs" of the Nacirema themselves. By responding to the needs of the technocrats the adult educators supported the ideology of the technocrats and helped them to maintain control over the lives of every Nacirema including the adult educator.[10]

The adult educator who supported policies that led to the "professional certification" of adult educators promoted alienation.[11] The Nacirema adult educators who supported policies that led to greater control over the adult educator and hence the adults he taught promoted alienation.[12]

Any Nacirema adult educator who forced their students to comply with standardized time schedules or who emphasized learning was a function of time, alienated their students.

Although Llessur Nosdunk observed alienated Nacirema adult educators as well as other Nacirema educators, and observed them all perpetuating the technocratic ideology of production dominance over the masses[13] he believed the Nacirema adult educator was in a unique social, political, and economic position to affect the Nacirema masses to revolt against the technocratic elite, hence "dealienate" the entire Nacirema society.

In the second volume of his two volume compendium, Llessure Nosdunk briefly delineated his plan to "dealienate" the Nacirema by using the Nacirema adult educator.

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Unless the Nacirema learn to regulate their behavior more in terms of "how they interact with each other", "how they interact with their environment", and "how they interact with themselves", they will be exterminated by technocratic control.[14]

According to Nosdunk's projections there are several ways the Nacirema adult educator can "dealienate" the Nacirema people. The adult educator is in a unique position to effect change in the technocratic structure because adult education has a "direct" effect upon other adults in every segment of the Nacirema society.

Adult education is the only Nacirema educational system that permeates the entire Nacirema society. The elementary school system effects only the Nacirema children. The high school system effects only Nacirema children who are older; and the Nacirema university system mostly effects Nacirema between the ages of 17 and 22, whereas the adult and continuing and vocational educational system potentially effects everyone beyond the age of 22. Since the average age of the Nacirema society is approximately twenty-five years of age, this places the adult educator in a unique position to effect change. The Adult educator is the only educator in the political position to dealienate the power elite in communities that ultimately make-up the greater power elite; the technocrats. The adult educator is the educator who takes the inservice programs to capital buildings. He is the only Nacirema educator who takes inservice programs to industry and to union members who have strong control in legislature. Similarly, the Nacirema

adult educator is the only educator who can directly effect the Nacirema economy. Imagine what would happen to the Nacirema economy if adult education programs of all types, vocational programs and continuing education programs, dried up! There are 90 to 100 million Nacirema who are directly involved in continuing, vocational, and basic education of some kind or another.[15] Without this educational system it seems the Nacirema society would be severely handicapped. The Nacirema adult educational system is, for most Nacirema, the only source of professional advancement and life fulfillment even if it is directly under the control of the technocrats.

Briefly, the Nacirema adult educator is in as much a "power" position in the Nacirema society as the technocrats, and could potentially provide the entire Nacirema society with great leadership.

It was one of Llessur's abiding convictions that in order for the Nacirema to become dealienated they had to be educated to the political and economic order of the Nacirema technocrat. The Nacirema people had to be informed of the exploitive practices of the Nacirema technocrat. Once the Nacirema adult educator penetrates the social shell of the Nacirema technocrat through adult education programs, he is in the position to inform the Nacirema people for educational revolt and hence "dealienation."

Llessur Nosdunk believed that the Nacirema had to become human before they could function socially as sharing citizens. He thought the Nacirema had to be unified by being taught to depend upon one another rather than products of technology. He believed adult education programs built around the affective domain of the Nacirema could stimulate dependence on human interaction and suffocate their dependence upon technocratic rule. Adult education programs that could stimulate this dependence are human sensitivity programs, or programs that help the Nacirema develop their internal needs, rather than

the needs they have developed as a direct result of the established norms of the technocrats.

Before Nacirema adult educators could dealienate others, according to Nosdunk, they had to dealienate themselves. This was a problem for Nosdunk, but he thought it could be overcome if alienated adult educators formed a union to attempt to better understand why they, like other Nacirema, felt uneasy with themselves and their environment. As long as adult educators question their own roles as educators of the Nacirema, and the probability they are technocratic instruments of control, they will be aware of the damaging effects of alienation and resist it.

Although Nosdunk claimed every Nacirema was alienated, he thought it was highly improbable every Nacirema adult educator was equally suppressed by alienation. In otherwords, he thought it was highly probable at least several Nacirema adult educators were acutely sensitive to their own alienation and were capable of dealienating themselves. Nosdunk also claimed other Nacirema who were not adult educators could equally dealienate themselves, but their effect upon the entire Nacirema society was negligible.

References

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[2]Hoopes, Ned E. "Who Am I?: Essays on the Alienated." New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969, p. 165.

[3]Keniston, Kenneth. "The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society." New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1965, p. 73.

[4]Besag, Frank P. "Alienation and Education: An Empirical Approach." Buffalo, New York: Hertillon Press, 1966, pp. 3-7.

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[9]Laing, R. D. "The Politics of Experience." New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, pp. 10-14.

[10]Murchland, Bernard. "The Age of Alienation." New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 128-129.

[11]Krietlow, Burton (ed.) "Examining Controversies in Adult Education." San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981, Chapter 5.

[12]Ibid. Chapters 3 and 6.

[13]Besag, Frank P. pp. 1-8.

[14]Bruno, Frank J. "Human Adjustment and Personal Growth: Seven Pathways." New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977, pp. 77-78.

[15]Cross, Patricia K. "A Critical Review of State and National Studies of The Needs and Interests of Adult Learners." National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C., September, 1977.

Chapter 10

The "Is-Ought-Is" Problem of the Objective in Adult Education

INTRODUCTION

A philosophical problem called the "is-ought-is" dichotomy has existed in philosophical discourse perhaps for centuries, but only since the turn of the twentieth century has this problem received considerable attention from philosophers.

In 1903 G.E. Moore, a British philosopher, labelled the "is-ought-is" dichotomy the "naturalistic fallacy." According to Moore, anyone who claimed a descriptive proposition, e.g., the car is yellow, entailed

an evaluative proposition, e.g., the yellow car is good, committed the "naturalistic fallacy".[1]

Searle, a philosophy professor who teaches at the University of California-Berkeley, claims the opposite. He claims there is no dichotomy between "is" propositions, or descriptive propositions and "ought" propositions, or evaluative propositions. According to Searle, Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" is a fallacy, and an evaluative proposition can in 'fact' be derived from a descriptive proposition and the converse.[2]

The "is-ought-is" dichotomy is more than a dispute among philosophers over the proper use of the language of deriving "is" propositions from "ought" propositions and the converse, however. It is a realistic dispute between "facts" and "values", and whether or not "facts" are derivable from "values" and the converse. Any adult educator who has the responsibility of evaluating adult education programs and learner performance faces this problem. Steele is one such adult educator who recognized this problem when she wrote:

> Program evaluation is the process of judging (or a JUDGMENT as to) the worth or value of a program. This judgment is formed by comparing EVIDENCE as to what the program "is" with CRITERIA as to what the program "should be."[3]

Although Searle approached the "is-ought-is" dichotomy from a linguistic perspective, he argued the

general importance of examining this problem when he wrote:

> The alleged distinction between descriptive and evaluative statements is really a conflation of at least two distinctions. On the one hand there is a distinction between different kinds of illocutionary acts including evaluations, another family including descriptions. On the other hand there is a distinction between utterances which involve claims objectively decidable as true or false and those which involve claims not objectively decidable, but which are 'matters of personal decision' or 'matters of opinion'.[4]

Searle believes that by making these distinctions people will be able to give useful theoretical explanations of the distinction between facts and values, and hence settle "fact-value" disputes.

Since adult educators and philosophers appear to be equally troubled by the "is-ought-is" dichotomy but in the form of evaluation criteria or 'objectives', it seems worthwhile to analogously examine the "is-ought-is" dichotomy as it relates to the use of 'objectives' in adult education programming and evaluation.

The purpose of this article is (1) to show that "adult education objectives", regardless of how they are stated, must be evaluative propositions rather than descriptive propositions, (2) as evaluative propositions they cannot be used as "evidence" to defend the cancellation or repetition of programs, or the production of new

programs, or as "evidence" that X adult is competent, and (3) to present a possible solution to the "is-ought-is" dichotomy as it relates to the use of evaluative objectives in adult education so adult educators can justify the use of evaluative objectives as criteria for evaluating adult education programs and the competency of adult learners.

ADULT EDUCATION OBJECTIVES AS EVALUATIVE PROPOSITIONS

An adult education objective is a descriptive proposition if and only if it is a sentence that is true or false or can be determined to be true or false empirically.[5] Following are some adult education objective that were selected from adult education literature:[6]

1. the learner shall be able to rank various statements of issues according to their relevance;

2. the learner shall be able to identify among a number of statements the assumptions which must be made in order to accept a particular issue as crucial;

3. to assure participation of all relevant parties in policy making and management of the adult education operation;

4. to provide staff service to the program at a high level of excellence;

5. to develop effective work habits and skills;

6. to obtain information that will promote continous program improvements;

7. given 30 simple sentences, the learner will identify the subjects in these sentences by correctly underlying at least 80% of them;

8. following a unit on classical music, the learner will demonstrate his appreciation of classical music by voluntarily attending at least one concert during a two month period;

9. reads at least three more nonfiction books than he did last year;

10. enrolls in at least one more class, workshop, or seminar than he did last year; and

11. watches educational programs on television more often than last year.

Although each of the foregoing objectives ~~are~~ stated differently, ~~they all~~ each one either implicitly or explicitly contains the same elements which suggest none of them can be claimed as 'empirically' true or false or determined to be empirically true or false; therefore, none of them ~~are~~ is descriptive propositions. And, since none of them ~~are~~ is a descriptive propositions they must all be evaluative.

~~Each~~ of the eleven objectives are evaluative propositions, or propositions that cannot be determined true or false empirically, because they all "direct" or "command"[7] a learner to reach X result or that X result will obtain from the objective. Furthermore, because each objective is predetermined either by the learner or the adult educator before an evaluation can occur, ~~they~~ each one must ~~all~~ state a "desired" effect or result; therefore, each objective is an evaluative proposition since a statement of desire is materially equivalent[8] with a result that "ought" to occur rather than a result that "is" in fact the case.

Therefore, since all objectives used in adult education to evaluate adult learners performance and adult education programs are evaluative rather than descriptive, "How can they validly be used as criteria to determine the value of adult education programs and the competency of adult learners?"

The polemic raised here is analogous to the "is-ought-is" dichotomy that has troubled philosophers for years. The difficulty with using objectives in adult education as devices to evaluate adult education programs and adult learner performance that are evaluative in nature is that only evaluative propositions can generate evaluative propositions, and evaluative propositions are not empirical evidence. Therefore, the adult educator has no empirical evidence upon which to defend the cancellation, repetition, or production of adult education programs, or the competency of adult learners. Since empirical evidence is the only 'kind' of evidence that is ordinarily accepted as justification for repeating, cancelling, or producing adult education programs, and certifying X adult is competent, the objectives that are used in evaluation in adult education MUST yield empirical evidence. But if all the objectives used in adult education are evaluative propositions ("ought" propositions) rather

than descriptive propositions ("is" propositions), "where does the adult educator who is responsibe for programming and evaluation obtain the necessary empirical evidence needed to show X program is of "empirical value" or X adult is "empirically competent"? According to Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" the adult educator is trapped in the "is-ought-is" dichotomy, and cannot transcend it without appeal to some radical change in the way evaluations are conceived in adult education. According to the "naturalistic fallacy" the adult educator cannot defend his/her evaluations logically or empirically if he/she continues to use the objective as the nuclean device or criterion of evaluations. Therefore, the adult educator should either admit with honesty that he/she cannot empirically evaluate X programs or the conpetency of X adults within his/her current evaluation framework, or should seek to devise evaluation methods that are empirically defensible.

Although Searle,[9] Tomberlin,[10] and Downing,[11] have shown that an "ought" (evaluative) proposition is deducible from an "is" (descriptive) proposition, they have not shown that an "is" proposition is deducible from an "ought" proposition, and it is the solution to this second difficulty that the adult educator needs if he/she continues to use evaluative objectives as criteria for evaluations.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Two adaptations of Searle's,[12] solution to G.E. Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" are presented here so the adult educator can view the problem facing him if he held the position that objectives in adult education were "is" propositions or descriptive propositions rather than "ought" proposition or prescriptive propositions.

The two following adaptations were derived from Searle's original argument:

1. Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars'.
2. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
5. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.[13]

Adaptations For Adult Education

(I)

a. X adult learner uttered the words, (or wrote them down) 'I hereby promise to solve for you, the adult educator (Y) or myself (Z), 30 mathematical problems in (T) time.

b. X adult learner promised to solve 30 mathematical problems for (Y) and/or (Z) in (T).

c. X adult learner placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to solve 30 mathematical problems for (Y) and/or (Z) in (T).

d. X adult learner <u>is</u> under an obligation to solve 30 mathematical problems for (Y) and/or (Z) in (T).

e. X adult learner ought to solve 30 mathematical problems for (Y) and/or (Z) in (T).

(II)

a. X adult educator uttered the words, (or wrote them down) 'I hereby promise to give you, the public, Y "good" adult education programs.

b. X adult educator promised to give the public Y "good" adult education programs.

c. X adult educator placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to give the public Y "good" adult education programs.

d. X adult educator is under an obligation to give the public Y "good" adult education programs.

e. X adult educator ought to give the public Y "good" adult education programs.

According to Searle's original argument, (e.) in both adaptations is an "ought" proposition that has been derived from "is" premis es and shows that G.E. Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" is a fallacy because premis es (a.) and (b.) of both adaptations and his original argument are empirical-factual-is propositions (artifacts) derived from "institutional facts", or conditions of social acceptance. Furthermore, according to Searle one's language is a reflection of one's reality, and the reality of making promises is empirical.[14]

Although the adult educators problem is not one of deriving an "ought" proposition, or an "ought" objective from an "is" proposition, or an "is" objective as illustrated above, they are faced with the problem of defensively showing

that an "is" (descriptive-empirical) objective (proposition) can be derived from an "ought" (prescriptive-evaluative) objective (proposition) since as pointed out earlier, all adult education objectives must necessarily be "ought" objectives rather than "is" objectives. Therefore, (e.) of both (I) and (II) are the starting points for adult educators attempting to defend their evaluations, and not (a.) and (b.) of (I) and (II). Since Searle's solution is illuminating in terms of descriptive objectives rather than prescriptive objectives it sheds little light on solving the dilemma of deriving an "is" from an "ought" that faces adult educators.

It appears the only way the adult educator can overcome the apparent paradoxical dichotomy between "ought" objectives and empirically deducible defensible evaluations or "is" propositions, is to view the problem primarily as epistemic (based on knowledge claims) rather than logical.

Both "ought" propositions (objectives) and "is" propositions (objectives) are knowledge claims contingent upon observation of empirically verifiable events, conditions, and objects existent in the world. For example, before a person can make a value judgment or an "ought" claim or "ought" objective, there must exist a knowable condition, event, or object which the "ought" claim or "ought" objective is directed.

Similarily, before a person can make an "is" claim or an "is" objective, that X or Y is or is not the case, there must exist a knowable condition, event, or object which the "is" claim or "is" objective is directed. Therefore, since both "is" claims or "is" objectives and "ought" claims or "ought" objectives are both knowledge claims contingent upon a knowable existent condition, event, or object, both "is" and "ought" claims are empirical and deducible from the other. In this sense then, an "ought" or evaluative objective can generate empirically defensible "is" or descriptive objectives since knowledge claims are empirically and hence 'logically' reducible to observations of the world.

Knowing this, the adult educator "ought" (can) to be-able to confidently and empirically claim "X adult is competent in Y", and "X program is 'good' or 'bad' according to institutional facts (acceptance)" without committing any fallacies comparable to Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" since to claim "X adult is competent in Y" is to claim "X adult 'ought' to be competent in Y", and to claim "X program 'is' 'good' or 'bad' is to claim X program 'ought' to be'good' or 'bad'". From this epistemic framework, the adult educator can empirically defend every evaluation made from "ought" or "evaluative objectives".

FOOTNOTES

[1]Moore, G.E., PRINCIPIA ETHICA. Cambridge University Press, 1903.

[2]Searle, John R., "How To Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'", THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 73, January, 1964.

[3]Steele, Sara M., "Program Evaluation--A Broader Definition," THE JOURNAL OF EXTENSION, Summer, 1970, p. 8.

[4]Searle, John R. SPEECH ACTS, AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 187.

[5]Copi, Irving M. INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC. Lordon: Macmillan Co., 1976, pp. 5-10.

[6]Since these eleven objectives were randomly selected from the following specified sources it is assumed they are representative of all objectives used in adult education: (1) and (2) from ADULT EDUCATION: OUTLINES OF AN EMERGING FIELD OF UNIVERSITY STUDY. (ed.) by Gale Jensen, A.A. Liveright, and Wilbur Hallenbeck, The Adult Education Association, 1964, p. 229.; (3), (4), (5), and (6) from THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION: ANDRAGOGY VERSUS PEDAGOGY. by Malcolm Knowles, Association Press, New York, 1970, p.226,227, 229, and 230.; (7) and (8) from THE FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETENCY BASED EDUCATION. (ed.) by Robert T. Utz and Leo D. Leonard, Kendall-Hunt Pub. Co., Dubuque, Iowa, 1975, pp. 5-6.; (9), (10) and (11) from "Program Evaluation--A Broader Definition". by Sara Steele, THE JOURNAL OF EXTENSION, Summer, 1970, p. 9.

[7]Copi, Irving M.,INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC. pp. 5-10. According to Copi a 'directive' or a 'command' is a sentence that has no propositional meaning that can be determined to be true or false empirically. Copi does however, overlook the fact that 'directives' and 'commands' could be knowledge claims about a speaker who utters 'directives' and 'commands' and hence in this sense may be determined true or false empirically, since one could verify X person gave Y 'directive' or Y 'command'.

[8]If I write an objective for myself it must have material equivalence with my desires or wants regardless of the way it is stated. The same is true of any objective

that is written for me. For example, if I write my own objective, "to learn X in T time" it must somehow be logically connected to my desire or wants"to learn X in T time"; for if objectives, regardless of their origin, had no material equivalence with my desires or wants (if X then Y, where X is my desire or want, and Y is the outcome) objectives would have no meaning or function.

[9]Searle, John R., "How To Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'".

[10]Tomberlin, James E.,"The Is-Ought Dichotomy: A Modest Proposal", THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, 6, Winter, 1972.

[11]Downing, F. Gerald, "Ways Of Deriving 'Ought' From 'Is'". THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 22, July, 1972.

[12]Searle, John R., "How To Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'", pp. 177-178.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., 176-185.